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ABSTRACT
The topic of the paper is very important, as it comes up at a time when the Egyptians have come
to a point that reforming Egypt’s justice system is a hopeless case. This is due to the outdated and
inefficient way of thinking and performing in the judiciary. Thus the goal of this paper is to make
an intellectual contribution to a sustainable reform program of the Egyptian judiciary and namely
the systems of judicial appointment and judicial training using their roles as agents of progress and
development. This aspiring research argues that the Higher Council of Judicial Entities and Bodies
(hereinafter the Higher Council) is not necessarily threatening judicial independence but rather
creating a balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. However, some
modifications must be made to its formation as a part of my proposals for reform. While the
National Training Academy (hereinafter the NTA) is not appropriate nor ideal to train the members
of the justice system because of the judicial leadership and ownership of the judicial training, thus,
an independent body responsible for appointing and training judges shall be established and this
will be displayed in my proposals for reform project at the end of this research paper.

KEYWORDS: Egyptian Justice System – Judicial Appointment and Judicial Training – Judicial
Independence and Judicial Accountability – The Higher Council for Judicial Bodies – The NTA
National Training Academy – Comparative Judicial Councils – Comparative Judicial Schools –
The NJA National Judicial Academy – The ENM Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature – Escuela
Judicial Consejo General del Poder Judicial
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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern and fast changes in any society require higher qualifications for the successful functioning
of government. Hence, the judiciary, as one of the three branches of government, requires qualified
and skilled individuals to operate the justice system in the best manner.1 However, the improper
practices performed in the systems of judicial appointment and judicial training have weakened
the credibility and efficiency of the Egyptian justice system. Therefore, my main objective of this
paper is to reform the systems of appointment and training in the Egyptian judiciary.
What made me came to this specific topic and what made me link the judicial appointment with
judicial training and their relation with judicial independence and judicial accountability can be
summarized in a nutshell, as simple as follows: Judicial independence requires that the judicial
branch is accountable for its competency.2 In parallel, judicial competency can be improved by
judicial appointment. However, even the most strict appointment methods,3 cannot guarantee the
continued proficiency of the judiciary.4 At the same time, the best tool to improve professional
competency is through proper training.5 Therefore, proper judicial appointment and convenient
judicial training are necessary for increasing judicial competency and promoting judicial
independence and accountability. Judicial appointment and judicial training can be used as agents
for progress and development in the justice system and the whole society. They contribute to, along
with many other methods, end discrimination and gender bias, increase diversity on the bench,
and increase judicial competency and efficiency which in turn increase judicial accountability and
consequently increase judicial independence.
Judicial reformers or researchers interested in this field usually when discussing judicial reform
programs focus more on judicial independence rather than judicial accountability and their effects
on judicial competency and efficiency. This paper’s contribution to such a field is that it argues
that a judiciary that is not accountable is not truly independent. The slogan of judicial independence
is being used by Egypt’s judiciary as a tactic to avoid any accountability to either the other
1

Laurance M. Hyde, Essentials of a Modern State Judicial System, Notre Dame L. Rev., 236 (1955).
Helen Gregorczuk, The Desirability of Judicial Education in Australia, 14 J. of Professional Legal
Educ., 89 (1996).
3
S.I. Strong, Book Review of Richard A. Posner, Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary, J. of
Legal Educ., 421 (2017).
4
Id.
5
Id. at 422.
2

branches of government or to the public. This paper argues that a sustainable justice reform to the
systems of judicial appointment and judicial training shall include all the justice stakeholders from
other branches of government, the private legal profession, and civil society.
Therefore, I am beginning chapter one by explaining the systems of judicial appointment and
judicial training in Egypt in detail where I indicate that there are many drawbacks in both systems
that need to be addressed and reformed. The drawbacks of the judicial appointment system can be
summarized as follows: 1) gender inequality and discrimination against women. 2) discrimination
against candidates of lower socio-economic classes. 3) judicial nepotism and favoritism. 4)
abstention from appointing lawyers and law professors. 5) lengthy appointment process. While the
drawbacks of the judicial training system can be summarized as follows: 1) the budgets assigned
to judicial training programs. 2) the intra-institutional disputes among the judicial institutions. 3)
the fragmentation of training centers in the judicial institutions.
In chapter two, I highlight the role of the newly established Higher Council and the newly created
NTA in both systems of judicial appointment and judicial training where I discussed the arguments
stating that both of the newly created bodies are posing threats to the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, chapter two consists of two main parts. The first main part is concerning the Higher Council,
I counter-argue this argument by arguing that the Higher Council does not necessarily threaten
judicial independence. I use three methods to support my argument, the first is through discussing
the reluctance of the judiciary to reform the system of judicial appointment where I demonstrate
the two famous examples of 2005 and 2007, besides the struggle of women to be Public
Prosecutors and State Council Judges since 1946 to 2010 and even after the 2014 Constitution that
clearly provides for the right of women to hold judicial positions in all judicial institutions. I
conclude that the judiciary would never accept appointing women as judges except after the
participation of the Executive, as a type of checks and balances technique, in allowing women to
sit on the bench.
The second method I use to support my argument is discussing the status of the judiciary with
respect to independence and accountability in the 2014 Constitution where I explain that before
the referendum on constitutional amendments establishing the Higher Council in 2019, the
Egyptian judiciary enjoyed wide autonomy, and not independence, that made it isolate itself more
whether from the public or the other branches of government. Thus, the Higher Council helps in

2

the creation of bridges and shared spaces whether between the different judicial institutions or
between the judicial institutions and the other branches of government. The third method I use is
analyzing the comparative systems regarding higher councils for the judiciary, where I indicate
that the presence of political members, whether from the Legislature or the Executive, in higher
councils does not necessarily threaten judicial independence, thus, the mixed composition is not
against the judicial independence if the majority of the members are judges. However, I propose
that the formation of the Higher Council should be modified in chapter three.
The second main part of chapter two is concerning the NTA and its expanding role in training
judges, thus providing a backdoor for the Executive to control the training and education of judges.
I argue that the NTA is not appropriate nor ideal to act as a training academy for judges and
prosecutors. I use two methods to support my argument. The first method is through analyzing the
principle of judicial leadership of judicial training and the principle of judicial ownership of
judicial training and the necessity of locating judicial training at the heart of the judiciary. The
second method is through studying the comparative systems of judicial schools.
In chapter three, I highlight the roles of judicial appointment and judicial training as agents for
development and progress within the judiciary, followed by the reform of judges’ mentality
through judicial training. Then, I explain the importance of the modification of the Higher
Council’s formation. Subsequently, I propose a reform project for both systems of judicial
appointment and judicial training. I begin my reform project by highlighting the importance of
creating an independent body responsible for appointing and training judges, then I discuss the
most appropriate reform that can be implemented in Egypt. I end my reform project by proposing
the creation of the NJA as the sole training center for all judicial institutions and all personnel
working in the justice system. Finally, I state some recommendations that must be adopted and
endorsed in the newly created NJA.

3

II. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING IN EGYPT
Globally, the performance of judges after their appointment affects society’s attitudes toward
judicial institutions and the public confidence in them. From the quality of judicial performance,
one can know how a country respects the rule of law. The judicial performance also can give
indicators of the level of the economic performance in a country.6 In Egypt, the systems of judicial
appointment and judicial training need to be reformed.7 As they have several shortcomings that
must be tackled urgently to build an efficient justice system that delivers the service of justice to
its society in a fair and fast manner. Before discussing these drawbacks, firstly, we need to get a
closer look at both systems. Therefore, this chapter is divided into three main parts, first part is
displaying the Egyptian judicial appointment system with its two main segments which are: the
appointment requirements and the appointment procedures. The second part is about the Egyptian
judicial training system and is composed of two sections: the first is the definition and objectives
of judicial training, followed by the second section which is a close look at the five different
judicial training centers in the different judicial institutions. In the third part, I will show, the
readers and researchers interested in Egypt’s justice system, and the need for reforming both
systems of judicial appointment and judicial training. Thus, the third part will be divided into two
main sections: the first section is demonstrating the defects of the judicial appointment system,
while the second section is showing the drawbacks of Egypt’s judicial training system.
A. Judicial Appointment System in Egypt
First, it must be noted that globally there are different models of judicial selection which can be
divided into four models. Judicial appointment may take place through popular election, by the
executive, by the legislature, or appointment by the judiciary itself. Most countries use mixed
models in the whole judicial recruitment process where the final recruitment step is left to the
executive through the Minister of Justice or the Head of State.8 Another model of judicial
appointment can be added to the aforementioned four models, which is the appointment by a

6

Samuel Spac, Recruiting European Judges in the Age of Judicial Self-Government, 19 GERMAN L.J.
2078, 2079 (2018).
7
Shams Al Din Ahmed Al Hajjaji, Form of Reform: Judicial Reform in Egypt Lessons from the
Developed Countries, (Hereinafter Al Hajjaji Form of Reform), Univ. of Cal. 129 (2016).
8
Luis Muniz-Arguelles & Migdalia Fraticelli-Torres, Selection and Training of Judges in Spain, France,
West Germany, and England, 8 B. C. INT'l & COMP. L. REV. 8 (1985).
4

judicial council.9 The judicial council is an independent council that sends the list of judicial
nominees to the executive or the legislature to issue the appointment decree. The judicial council
typically consists of members from the three government branches as well as lawyers and law
academics.10
In Egypt’s appointment system of judges, judges appoint their peers.11 Judges, prosecutors, and
members of the judiciary are appointed by the high boards of the four judicial institutions.12 These
high boards are composed exclusively of the most senior seven members of each judicial
institution. The four judicial institutions are the Ordinary Judiciary and the Public Prosecution as
one institution with one high board, the Council of State, the Administrative Prosecution, and
finally the State Lawsuits Authority. The high board of Ordinary Judiciary and the Public
Prosecution is called the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC),13 while the high board of the
Administrative Judiciary (the Council of State) is called the Special Board.14 The Same applies to
the Administrative Prosecution Authority and the State Lawsuits Authority, where the high board
in each of the two authorities is called the Supreme Council.15 The appointment of new members
of the judiciary is regulated by the law related to each judicial institution. The appointment system
can be divided into two main groups, firstly: the appointment requirements, and secondly: the
appointment procedures.
1. The Judicial Appointment Requirements
The requirements for judicial appointment in Egypt are very few, compared to the requirements
adopted in other countries such as France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Macedonia, Poland, Russia,

9

Iveth A.Plascencia, Judicial Appointments: A Comparative Study of Four Judicial Appointment Models
Used by Sovereigns Around the World, L. Sch. Student Scholarship, at 13, (2015).
10
Id. at 16.
11
International Bar Association, Separating Law and Politics: Challenges to the Independence of Judges
and Prosecutors in Egypt, 22 (2014). (hereinafter Separating Law and Politics)
12
I use the term “judicial institutions” in this paper to describe the four judicial entities and bodies that are
namely: the Ordinary Judiciary and the Public Prosecution as one institution with one high board, the
Council of State, the Administrative Prosecution, and finally the State Lawsuits Authority.
13
See Judicial Authority Law No 46 of 1972 amended by Law No 35 of 1984.
14
See State Council Law No 47 of 1972 amended by Law No 136 of 1984.
15
See the Administrative Prosecution Authority Law No. 117 of 1958 and the State Lawsuits Authority
Law No. 75 of 1963.
5

Ukraine, and other civil law countries.16 The appointment requirements of the Egyptian judiciary
can be classified into two categories which are namely: general conditions and educational
requirements. Firstly, the general conditions are: 1) the nationality of the candidate and his/her full
civil capacity. 2) accumulative academic grade shall not be less than “Good”. 3) age shall not
exceed thirty years on the date of the last day of application. 4) the eligibility, competence, and
qualification required to hold this judicial position according to the assessment of the competent
committee in the judicial institution. This one means that the candidate shall not be convicted by
courts or disciplinary boards for having committed crimes of dishonor, in addition to, the good
reputation of the candidate. 5) shall pass the interview and the test that is determined by the judicial
institution. 6) medical fitness shall be proved according to the tests and the examinations from the
competent authorities that are determined by the judicial institution. These conditions are stated in
the Judicial Authority Law governing the Ordinary Judiciary and the Public Prosecution,17 the
same is applied in the other laws of the other three judicial institutions.
Secondly, the only educational requirement in Egypt is a bachelor’s law degree with an
accumulative grade of ‘Good’.18 The Egyptian judicial institutions do not require the candidates
to enter admission exams before appointment to ensure the appointment of the most qualified
applicants.19 The educational requirements differ from one country to another as some countries
require a higher law academic degree to be appointed in judicial positions.20
2. The Judicial Appointment Procedures
The appointment process is mainly consisting of five stages. It starts with the announcement by
the judicial institutions for judicial vacancies. Then the applicants shall go through the interview
stage. After it, the passing candidates are security checked as well as their families. Then the
security cleared candidates go through the medical examinations.21 The successful candidates are

16

See generally, Lee Epstein et al. Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, William and Marry Bill of
Rights J. 7 (2001). (A comparative analysis of judicial selection systems in 27 European countries).
17
See Judicial Authority Law No. 42 of 1972, art. 38.
18
Adel Omar Sherif, Overview of the Egyptian Judicial System, and its History, Y.B. of Islamic and
Middle Eastern L. 12 (1998).
19
Mohamed Nour Farhat and Ali Sadek, ‘Report on the State of the Judiciary in Egypt’, The Arab Center
for the Development of the Rule of law and Integrity 51.
20
Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji, The Reform of Judicial Appointment Process in the Ordinary Judiciary in
Egypt, (Hereinafter Al Hajjaji Reform),‘The Reform Middle East L. and Governance J., 2 (2017).
21
Id. at 22.
6

approved by the Supreme Boards of the judicial institutions, and their names are sent to the
President of the Republic via the Minister of Justice where a presidential decree is issued to ratify
these approvals and declare the appointment of these candidates as new members of the judicial
institutions.
The first stage of the appointment process is the Announcement. An announcement of each one of
the four judicial institutions is published, stating the following: Whoever applies for the
appointment to this position shall – in addition to the general conditions stipulated in the law –
pass the following: 1) Their cumulative grades shall not be less than “Good”. 2) Their ages shall
not exceed thirty years on the date of the last day of electronic registration. 3) Shall have the
eligibility, competence, and qualification required to hold this judicial position according to the
assessment of the competent committee in the judicial institution. 4) Shall pass the interview and
the test that is determined by the judicial institution. 5) Their medical fitness shall be proved
according to the tests and the examinations from the competent authorities that are determined by
the judicial institution. The announcement mentions the conditions for application.22 It states the
dates for taking application forms to be filled by the candidates and the deadline for submitting
such applications. After submitting the applications, the judicial institutions select candidates, who
meet the minimum requirement which is a law degree with a general accumulative grade of
“Good”, for being interviewed.23
The second stage is the oral interviews where the candidates are interviewed in a short oral
interview by the members of the high board of each of the judicial institutions where the candidates
are asked simple legal questions.24 The interview only lasts for a few minutes which is not adequate
to select the most qualified and appropriate candidates for such important positions.25 Following
the interview stage. The judicial institutions send the names of passing interviewees to the Ministry
of Justice. The third stage is the Security Checks. This stage is considered the longest stage in time.
The Ministry of Justice receives the names of all the passing interviewees and coordinates with
the Ministry of the Interior to make security checks on the candidates and their families. The

22

Id. at 9.
Id.
24
Id. at 21.
25
Foutouh El Chazli and Karim El Chazli, The Independence of the Judiciary in Egypt, EuroMediterranean Hum. Rts. Network (EMHRN), 50 (2010). https://euromedrights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/EGYPT-The-independence-of-the-Judiciary-EN.pdf
23

7

security checks are extended to include all the candidate's family members and reach the fourth
degree of kinship.26 In their application, candidates are required to write the names, addresses, and
jobs of family members up to the fourth degree. It includes parents, grandparents, siblings, uncles,
and cousins, as well as their respective spouses and their children.27 Candidates and their families
should have no criminal or disciplinary records.28
Stage four is the Medical Examination which consists of taking blood and urine samples from the
candidates to ensure that they are free from alcohol and drug intake.29 Whoever fails the tests are
excluded from the list of candidates.30 The fifth and last stage is the Presidential Decree issued by
the President of the Republic for the appointment of the passed candidates as the various laws of
the judicial institutions gives him/her the authority to issue the decree of appointment of the new
members of the judiciary.31 The President of the Republic issues the appointment decree based on
the nominations of the high board of each judicial institution.32
B. Judicial Training System in Egypt
Parallel to the four models of judicial selection systems I have mentioned before, there are two
different models for the judicial training systems. In England, judges are selected from legal
professionals, such as attorneys and barristers, who have previous legal practical experience, thus
they are not required to have legal training before their appointment and the same is adopted in the
USA, Australia, and most common law countries.33 While in France, Spain, and most European
civil law countries, judges must have law degrees, and after their appointment, they must make
more studies and take training in the judicial schools.34 First, we shall discuss the definition of
judicial training or education, followed by its objectives before displaying the status of judicial

26

See Al Hajjaji, supra note 7, at 10.
Id. at 10, 11.
28
Judicial Authority Law No. 46 of 1972, art. 38.
29
See Al Hajjaji, supra note 7, at 22.
30
Id.
31
See generally the Administrative Prosecution Authority Law No. 117 of 1958, the State Lawsuits
Authority Law No. 75 of 1963, The Judicial Authority Law No. 46 of 1972 and the State Council Law No.
47 of 1972.
32
Id.
33
Carlo Guarnieri, Appointment and Career of Judges in Continental Europe: The Rise of Judicial SelfGovernment, Legal Stud., 170 (2004).
34
Id.
27
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training in Egypt and the fragmentation of the judicial training centers across the Egyptian judicial
institutions.
1. Definition and Objectives
Judicial Training is a term used to include collegial meetings to discuss education topics and
includes distance learning, electronic and print, and there are initial and continuing programs.35
The most important objective of judicial training is to enhance judicial competence and help new
judges make a smooth transition to judicial office.36 It aims to provide judges with the required
knowledge and skills to properly perform their judicial works.37 Also, one of the goals of judicial
training is to raise the professional competence of judges to deliver proper justice service to their
societies. Judicial competence involves three parts which are legal knowledge, professional skills,
and judicial disposition. 38 In other words, judicial training is very vital as it enhances judicial
proficiency.39
Moreover, judicial training is necessary to maintain the independence of the judiciary, its
accountability as well as its impartiality, and effectiveness. Judges can improve their knowledge,
skills, and understanding of social and economic issues through judicial training. Furthermore,
judicial training enables judges in gaining a better understanding of the judicial function and they
can exchange knowledge with their peers, allowing them to learn from each other.40
The importance of judicial training is that, nowadays, around the world and not only in Egypt, the
judicial function is difficult and challenging and there is a global belief that judges’ legal education
from their youth does not qualify them to serve as judges today, which in turn means that
continuing judicial training is necessary for judges.41 As the social context keeps changing, judicial
training has to be a continuing process designed to help the judge to realize this change. Judges
need education and training before they are put on the job of adjudication of disputes and the
35

Geeta Oberoi, The Role of Judicial Education, Nat’l Jud. Acad. L. J., 1 (2008).
Livingston Armytage, Training of Judges: Reflections on Principle and International Practice, Eur. J.
Legal Educ. 27, 28 (2005).
37
Livingston Armytage, Judicial Orientation; Six Factors Influencing Programme Development, Int’l Bar
Ass’n, at 3, (1994).
38
Livingston Armytage, Judges as Learners: Reflections on Principles and Practice, 2nd International
Conference on the Training of the Judiciary, 12 (2004).
39
Id. at 3.
40
T. Brettel Dawson, Judicial Education: Pedagogy for a Change, J. of Disp. Resol., 2 (2015).
41
Evan Bell, Letter to a New Judge, Commonwealth L. Bull., 98 (2014).
36

9

administration of justice.42 The Judicial training is found in many international instruments
concerning the status of judges. For example, the Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary stipulate that: “Persons selected for judicial offices shall be individuals of integrity and
ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law.”43
2. The Status of Judicial Training in Egypt
Egypt was one of the best judicial training hubs in the Middle East, however, it is weak
nowadays.44 The training programs offered to new judges and prosecutors have been reduced from
a year to a few weeks of non-intensive basic training.45 This produces unqualified judicial members
who are unable to perform their judicial works properly. The laws governing the Egyptian judicial
institutions do not include any provision related to the training of its members. The Egyptian
judiciary does not have any training strategy for its members.46 Thus, there is no legal training
before judicial appointments,47 and also, after appointment, there is no mandatory continuing
judicial training.48
There are many calls for the reform of the justice system through judicial training but nothing has
been achieved.49 For decades, there were many attempts for establishing a judicial institute or
academy tasked with the training of the members of the judiciary but nothing was implemented.
There was a project for the transformation of the NCJS into a Judicial Academy.50 It shall include
an examination system for those applicants for all judicial institutions and the candidates must
attend 18 months’ training sessions and pass the graduation test.51 Judicial assistants shall be
subject to the same criteria. However, this academy did not gain the required and the strong support

42

NR Madhava Menon, Shaping of Future Judges: Tasks, Challenges and Strategies, J. of Nat’l L. Univ.
Delhi, 50 (2013).
43
See Article 10 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary endorsed by General
Assembly resolution no.40/32 and 40/146 of 1985.
44
David Risley, Egypt’s Judiciary: Obstructing or Assisting Reform, Middle East Instit., 9 (2016).
45
Id.
46
International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI), Justice at a Crossroads: The Legal
Profession and the Rule of Law in the New Egypt, 20 (2011).
47
See Al Hajjaji, supra note 7, at 18.
48
Id.
49
“Lamis Al-Hadidy, Judges need Training, Education and Reform, Al-Watan News, (24 January 2016).
Retrieved from: https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/936202
50
See Farahat and Sadek, supra note 19, at 56.
51
Id.
10

within the judiciary to become reality.52 In 2008, a law was drafted to support the idea of creating
a judicial academy where judicial candidates can spend an examination period before being
appointed to the judiciary.53 This law however was not submitted to the Parliament.
Regarding the status of judicial training in Egypt, we can divide it into two phases, firstly: the
judicial pre-appointment training, and secondly: the post-appointment training. On the one hand,
concerning the pre-appointment training, the Egyptian judiciary does not require any form of preappointment training to apply for judicial positions.54
Concerning the post-appointment training, on the other hand, the Egyptian judicial institutions
believe that “the best way to learn how to fight is to have one.”55 New members start their careers
with initial training varying between one month or two, and there is no continuing education for
judges.56 Furthermore, there is no clear policy for pre-appointment training in the system of
judicial selection.57 Moreover, the law schools and the judiciary do not recognize any sort of
judicial internships.58 However, the Council of State requires the new appointees to have two
diplomas of higher studies from law schools. The State Council Law No 47 of 1972 stipulated that
requirement to be promoted. 59 The absence of such requirement results in depriving the new
appointees in the rank of assistant delegates of the right to be promoted to the rank of delegates.
C. The Flaws of Egypt’s Systems of Judicial Appointment and Judicial Training
In Egypt, the two systems of judicial appointment and judicial training have many shortcomings
that must be addressed in a comprehensive judicial reform program. On the one hand, the defects
of the judicial appointment system can be divided into six defects. While, on the other hand, the
challenges that face the system of judicial training can be summarized in four challenges.

52

Id.
Nora Elbialy and Miguel A. García-Rubio, Assessing Judicial Efficiency of Egyptian First Instance
Courts: A DEA Analysis Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, 9 (2011).
54
Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji, Dilemma of Judicial Appointment in Egypt Questions of Gender Equality,
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1. Five Defects of the Judicial Appointment System
The judicial appointment system has many shortcomings and defects that influence the
competency and performance of the members of the judiciary.60 The defects of judicial
appointment can be categorized into 5 categories which are: a. gender inequality and
discrimination against women. b. discrimination against candidates of lower socio-economic
classes. c. judicial nepotism and favoritism. d. abstention from appointing lawyers and law
professors. e. lengthy appointment process.
The first defect is gender inequality and discrimination against women.61 There is a clear lack of
women representation in all three supreme courts which are: the Court of Cassation, the Supreme
Administrative Court (State Council), and the Supreme Constitutional Court. Apart from the
Administrative Prosecution Authority and the State Lawsuits Authority which appoint women,62
the courts of Ordinary Judiciary have around 16,000 men judges and a total of 66 women making
up a barely 0.4 percent of Egypt’s judges, while the Public Prosecution had no female
representation.63 It is worth mentioning that these 66 women judges were not appointed commonly,
after graduation from law schools as their male judges, however, they were transferred, by the
Minister of Justice, through secondment from among the already-appointed women in the
Administrative Prosecution Authority and the State Lawsuits Authority. The courts of
administrative jurisdiction (State Council) was rejecting appointing women since its establishment
in 1946. While the Supreme Constitutional Court has only 1 woman among the 15 members of the
Highest court in the country.
However, in October 2021, and after the creation of the Higher Council for Judicial Institutions
with the representation of the Executive in its formation, 98 female judges were appointed at the
courts of administrative jurisdiction (State Council) by way of transfer from the Administrative
Prosecution Authority and the State Lawsuits Authority. Also, 11 female judges were appointed
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in the Public Prosecution by way of transfer from the 66 women, already working, in the Ordinary
Judiciary.
The second defect is the discrimination against candidates of lower Socio-Economic classes.64 In
2013, the Supreme Judicial Council SJC, which is the governing council of the Ordinary Judiciary
and the Public Prosecution, rejected candidates who applied for the Public Prosecution because
their parents do not hold university degrees.65 This led tens of law school graduates to hold a press
conference at the Journalists Syndicate in a protest against this decision on 18 October 2014 calling
President Al-Sisi to interfere and impose social justice on the young judicial candidates. The issue
arose in September 2013,66 the SJC added new criteria to the appointments of prosecutors
stipulating that parents of candidates must be university graduates, this new criteria led to
retroactively excluding 138 of over 600 law graduates who were officially appointed as
prosecutors in June 2013. Furthermore, in May 2015, the Minister of Justice at that time Judge
Mahfouz Saber,67 when asked during a T.V. interview whether “the son of a cleaning worker can
be appointed in the judiciary.” He replied: “It is not acceptable to appoint such person, as applicants
for the judiciary should be from an accepted social class.” 68 Saber resigned from his position a
week later when his statements were being criticized widely as racist and discriminatory even by
some judges.69 The aforementioned practices of inequality became a tradition and laid a customary
rule within the Egyptian judiciary to favor the appointment of judges’ sons and relatives in judicial
posts, who constitutes an undeclared quota every year.70
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The third defect is judicial favoritism and nepotism in appointing members of the judiciary.71
Judges’ family members and relatives are appointed to judicial positions despite poor academic
grades.72 For example, the president of the Court of Tanta has 21 children and relatives who are
appointed as judges and prosecutors, even though some of them have poor university grades.73
Even after appointment, these judges benefit from special treatment, such as favorable
secondments and court transfers.74 The increased level of ‘patronage’ and clientelism in the
judiciary damaged the judicial impartiality, and the nepotistic practices in appointing members of
the judiciary shook the public confidence in the judiciary.75 In December 2009, Judge Ismail AlBassiouni,76 the former President of the Judges Club in Alexandria said that he supports the
inheritance in judicial positions, but at specific rates, to open the door to the outstanding fresh
graduates of law who do not have intermediaries or favoritism.77 Judge Al-Bassiouni, demanded a
special quota for the sons of judges in judicial positions, especially if the judge's son or daughter
lives in a judicial environment and has wisdom and sobriety.78 Moreover, in March 2012, Judge
Ahmed Al-Zend,79 the president of the Judges’ Club at that time, and then the Minister of Justice,
said that the appointments of judges’ children will continue to happen year after year, and no power
can stop this sacred practice.80
The fourth defect is the abstention from appointing lawyers and law professors. Theoretically
speaking, the Judicial Authority Law grants the right to lawyers and law professors to apply for
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sitting on the bench in the courts of the ordinary judiciary.81 In practice, however, judicial
appointment in the First Instance Courts is restricted to senior public prosecutors who have reached
the age of 30.82 The Supreme Judicial Council, which is in charge of the appointment in the
ordinary judiciary, never opened the doors for judicial appointment in the First Instance Courts to
any group other than senior public prosecutors.83 The Judicial Authority Law stipulates two quotas
for lawyers to be appointed as judges and prosecutors. Article 47 states that the yearly quota should
not be less than 25% for the appointment of judges in primary courts, and 10% for appointments
in the Court of Appeals.84 Whereas article 118 states that the quota of lawyers shall be no less than
25% of the total appointees each year for the Prosecution Office.85 However, both articles have
never been applied in judicial selection.86 These two articles have not been enforced yet due to
what has been perceived as judicial bigotry toward lawyers and law professors.87 The judiciary’s
acts are seen by some analysts as disappointing because such acts deprive the justice system of
richly experienced lawyers and law professors. 88 Other observers see that the SJC’s refusal to
appoint lawyers and law professors reflects an example of an entrenched ‘corporate culture’
among the judges.89
The fifth defect of Egypt’s judicial appointment system is the lengthy procedures which sometimes
take many years.90 For example, the presidential appointment decree of 2017’s batch in the public
prosecution was issued in April 2021 nearly after 4 years from the graduation,91 and the
appointment presidential decree of 2015’s batch was issued in 2020 in the administrative judiciary
as an assistant delegate in the State Council, which means after 5 years.92
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2. Three Drawbacks of the Judicial Training System
According to El-Bialy,93 many judges in Egypt are overworked and undertrained. There are huge
backlogs that hinder judges to deliver efficient justice and many people see that the justice system
is very slow. This is aggravated as judges generally work alone, without the assistance of law
clerks who are used in other court functions. Here, we shall demonstrate the drawbacks of the
judicial training system in Egypt and are hindering the establishment of a continuing and
mandatory judicial training system.94 We are going to display three main drawbacks which are: 1)
the budgets assigned to judicial training programs. 2) the intra-institutional disputes among the
judicial institutions. 3) the fragmentation of training centers in the judicial institutions.
Firstly, regarding the budgets assigned to judicial training programs, there is an insistent refusal
from the high boards of the judicial institutions to disclose the judicial budgets, this is to say that
there is a lack of necessary funds to justify the non-establishment of a judicial academy. In the past
decades, the judiciary’s justification for not creating a strong and effective judicial academy was
because of the lack of the necessary funding and the non-independent judicial budget. However,
currently, such justification has no base nor meaning. The 2014 constitution affirms the full
independence of the judicial budget.95 The judicial high boards became totally and completely
responsible for the administration of their judicial budgets in Egypt. Although the judiciary has a
full independent budget, it has never been made public. Therefore, the judiciary is not willing to
allocate the necessary funding for establishing a judicial academy. This indicates that judicial
training is not one of the top priorities of the high boards of the judicial institutions.
The second main drawback is the intra-institutional disputes among the judicial institutions on how
the judicial training curriculums will be structured, who will teach them, and what types of training
programs will be delivered. This led to the fact that each judicial institution has established its
education and training center which will be fully discussed shortly. For a demonstrating example
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of the judicial balkanization in Egypt, in 2016 the project of creating a judicial academy came
again to be discussed after many calls for decades, however, Judge Ahmad Al-Zend the former
Minister of Justice expressed his fears about the challenges that are facing such judicial academy,
he stated that one of the major obstacles is the four supreme judicial councils.96 This will lead us
to the rationale for establishing the Higher Council in 2019. The Higher Council will contribute to
bridging the gap between the judicial institutions as will be fully discussed in chapter 3.
The third main drawback of the Egyptian judicial training system is what I call the fragmentation
of the Egyptian judicial training system as there are many training centers across the Egyptian
judiciary, but with no effectivity in creating a continuous, mandatory, and well-designed programs
of judicial education and training. There are five judicial training centers across the country which
are, firstly: the National Center for Judicial Studies (NCJS), secondly: the Center for Judicial
Studies and Research of the State Council, thirdly: the Center for Judicial Training of the
Administrative Prosecution, fourthly: the Center for Judicial Studies of the State Lawsuits
Authority, fifthly: the Criminal Research and Training Institute of the Public Prosecution.
The first center, which is the main training center for all judicial institutions, is the National Center
for Judicial Studies (hereinafter NCJS) was established by the presidential decree No 347 of
1981.97 This center is under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice and its board is headed by
the Minister of Justice and the membership of the president of the Court of Cassation, the president
of the State Council, the Public Prosecutor, the President of the State Lawsuits Authority, the
director of the Administrative Prosecution, the Director of the Center, as well as four experienced
persons chosen by the Minister of Justice for a 1 year renewable.98 The Center Director is chosen
by way of secondment among the judges of the Court of Cassation or Courts of Appeal, which
means from the Ordinary Judiciary and the Public Prosecution only.99 The educational staff and
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the faculty of trainers are chosen on a part-time basis among practicing or retired members of
different judicial institutions, and several law school professors as well as experts.100
The NCJS’s budget is funded by the Ministry of Justice with low funds.101 The NCJS is the
principal center in charge of providing specialized training to judges throughout their professional
careers.102 However, the NCJS provides non-mandatory training courses that are not regulated and
not periodically organized.103 Article 2 of the presidential decree provides for the objectives of the
NCJS, the most important to our research are namely:104 1) training members of judicial
institutions and qualifying them theoretically and practically to practice judicial work. 2) improve
the technical and professional level of judicial assistants and employees working in assistant bodies
to judicial institutions.
One of the main goals of the NCJS is appointing the new members of judicial institutions,105 and
to put the rules that guarantee the proper selection of the new members of judicial bodies, and form
committees that perform their tests, and credit the admission results, and proposing their
distribution among the different judicial institutions.
The duration of the training sessions of the NCJS was at the beginning of its establishment between
six months to one year.106 The content of the training programs varies according to the trainees
whether they are new prosecutors or new judges. For new prosecutors, the training programs
include theoretical lectures related to the work of the Public Prosecution such as the penal law,
criminal procedural law, forensic medicine issues, and criminal investigation.107 Also, the training
programs provide trainees with the necessary investigation skills, pleading skills, writing legal
notes, and conducting legal research.108 As for new judges, the training sessions include theoretical
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lectures, case studies within small workshops, judgment grounding, and court sessions
management.109
At the beginning of the NCJS creation,110 the center was dedicated only to the training of members
of the Ordinary Judiciary either public prosecutors or ordinary judges.111 Then, in 1997, the NCJS
started to hold basic training sessions for the newly appointed administrative judges (Assistant
Delegates at the State Council),112 however, the State Council established its center for judicial
studies in 2011.
The second center is the Center for Judicial Studies and Research of the State Council established
by decision no. 607 for the year 2010 issued by the President of the State Council on 1 January
2011.113 The Center is presided by the president of the State Council and the membership of the
most senior 4 vice-presidents, the secretary-general, the assistant of the secretary-general, the
director of the center, as well as four members with the necessary experience chosen by the State
Council’s president.
The third center is the Center for Judicial Training of the Administrative Prosecution is
subordinated to the president of the Authority and its headquarters is in the authority presidency
building in the city of the 6th of October,114 and its high board is presided by the president of the
authority, and the membership of the director of the inspection department, the director of the
technical office of the authority’s president for the examinations and investigations, the secretarygeneral of the supreme council, the director of the administration of prosecutions, two experienced
prosecution members, one of them is chosen among the retired members and the other is chosen
among law professors.
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The fourth center is the Center for Judicial Studies of the State Lawsuits Authority which was
established in the State Litigation Authority,115 by decision no. 140 of 2017 issued on 22 August
2017. The center’s main objectives are to organize training courses for members of the judicial
body, paper and electronic publication of jurisprudence writings and judicial principles, as well as
the holding of conferences and related workshops on legal and judicial matters.
The fifth center is the Criminal Research and Training Institute of the Public Prosecution. In
December 2020, the Public Prosecutor and the President of the Court of Cassation inaugurated the
Criminal Research and Training Institute in Al-Shorouq City after its renovation.116 The institute
is responsible for the training of all members of the Public Prosecution in their different work
fields which are: criminal cases, family cases, traffic cases, and child cases.
To conclude this part regarding the status of judicial training in Egypt, we shall stop at the fact that
the number of judges who have a law degree higher than a law bachelor’s is very low. For example,
in the First Instance Courts (IFCs), the only qualification judges have is their law bachelor’s
certificate from law school. In 2009, only 16.7% of the total judicial staff of FICs in Egypt enjoys
a higher qualifying degree, like a Ph.D., Master’s, or even a certified diploma with a minimal
number of Ph.D. holders (1%).117
At the end of this chapter, I displayed the drawbacks of Egypt’s systems of judicial appointment
and judicial training. Given the inoperative and outdated appointment and training systems that we
have displayed previously, it is not surprising that the global rank of Egypt in the Rule of Law
index of the World Justice Project is 136 out of 139 countries around the world.118
On the one hand, as regards the judicial appointment, there are discriminatory practices performed
by the judicial institutions. The Egyptian judicial appointment system lacks transparency in criteria
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and standards for an efficient and properly-functioned judiciary.119 One of the prominent problems
that challenges the Egyptian judicial appointment is the lack of diversity within the justice
system.120 Any judicial appointment system that produces a non-diverse bench will not have public
confidence.121 This is because a non-diverse judiciary does not serve the needs of the society given
that the appointment system excludes qualified candidates.122
While on the other hand, as regards judicial training, many obstacles hinder the creation of
effective and well-designed education programs. The training system of Egypt’s members of the
judiciary is defective.123 Law school graduates are appointed as members of the judiciary without
any formal training before the judicial appointment and even after it.124 The previously mentioned
lead us to the conclusion that Egypt’s judiciary is not meeting the expectations and aspirations of
the Egyptians. Therefore, there is a great need to initiate a wide reform program to ensure that the
most qualified candidates hold judicial positions, as well as to guarantee that the judiciary’s
members are continuously well-trained and properly educated to be able to administer justice
according to the law and only the law and carry out their judicial functions in a proper manner that
serves at the end the Egyptian citizens who are the recipients of the justice service.
I highlighted the creation of the NCJS in 1981 which is responsible for judicial appointments and
judicial training whether initial or continuous, however, its appointment power has never been
activated since 1981, and its training authority is very ineffective which led each judicial institution
to create its training center leading to the fragmentation of the judicial training system.

119

Bahaa Ali El-Dean, Privatisation and the Creation of a Market Based Legal System: The case of
Egypt, Brill, 222 (2002).
120
See Al Hajjaji, supra note 20, at 18, 30.
121
Leo M. Romero, Enhancing Diversity in an Appointive System of Selecting Judges, 34 Fordham Urb.
L. J. 499 (2007).
122
Id.
123
Karim El Chazli, The Judiciary in the
Constitution: Lost Opportunities for Reform and Enshrinement of the Judiciary's Impenetrability, Arab
Reform Initiative, 10 (2014).
124
See generally, Nora El Bialy, The 2007 Judicial Reform and Court Performance in Egypt, 12 Rev. L.
& Econ., 96 (2016).
21

III. The Higher Council, the NTA, and the Comparative Systems
In the light of the defects and drawbacks of the appointment and training systems in the Egyptian
judiciary, the Higher Council and the NTA were established. Regarding the Higher council, some
analysts see that the Higher Council is considered an attack on the principle of judicial
independence and is considered as an attack on the principle of separation of powers.125 However,
my argument indicates the importance of balancing the judiciary’s wide autonomy with some
degree of accountability. This accountability is operationalized through the creation of the Higher
Council with the Executive representation in its formation while maintaining the substantial
representation of judges in its formation. This will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.
While regarding the NTA, some Egyptian judges fear that induction of judicial training from the
NTA would undermine judicial independence by providing a back door route to the executive
control. Despite, it is recognized that judicial training does not weaken judicial independence but
strengthens it,126 however, I argue that the NTA is not the appropriate body to deliver judicial
training to the Egyptian judges and prosecutors. I will support this argument by analyzing the
comparative systems of judicial training schools and the international standards mentioned in
many international and regional instruments in this regard.
Thus, chapter 2 is divided into two main parts, the first main part is demonstrating the
establishment of the Higher Council. This main part is consisting of three sections, where the first
section is about discussing the judicial reluctance of the reform of judicial appointments, besides
showing illustrative examples that evidence such judicial reluctance. While the second section is
about understanding the concepts of judicial independence and judicial accountability, followed
by analyzing the independence and accountability of Egypt’s judiciary under the 2014 constitution.
The third section is about analyzing the comparative systems as regards the higher council for
judiciaries. The second main part is about the establishment of the NTA and shows its expanding
role in training judges and prosecutors. This is followed by three sections which are: the first
section is an overview of the comparative judicial schools and highlights the process of appointing
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and training judges and prosecutors at the ENM in France. The second section analyzes the
leadership and the governing boards of the French Judicial School and the Spanish Judicial School.
Then I will display my conclusions of the aforementioned.
A. The Higher Council for Judicial Entities and Bodies (the Higher Council)
In chapter 1, I discussed the status of judicial appointment and judicial training systems in Egypt.
Also, I have manifested the need to reform both systems by showing their shortcomings and
drawbacks. In this chapter, I argue that the main reason for hindering judicial reform in both
systems is the judiciary itself. I support this argument by displaying the judicial reluctance and
sometimes resistance towards judicial reform, especially in these two fields. Egyptian judges use
the principle of judicial independence as a tactic to hinder any reform initiative. The Egyptian
judges usually raise the slogan of judicial independence to hinder any reform program that may
threaten their sectoral interests.
In this campaign, there is a belief that the newly established Higher Council, as prevalent, is
threatening the independence of the Egyptian judiciary. However, I counter this argument by
stating that it is promoting judicial independence by balancing judicial autonomy, and not
independence, with judicial accountability. I support my argument through three methods, firstly:
showing the reluctance of the judiciary to reform the judicial appointment system for sectoral
benefits. Secondly: analyzing the status of the autonomy of the Egyptian judiciary under the 2014
constitution. Thirdly: analyzing the comparative systems in the domain of higher councils for
judiciaries.
In 2019, article 185 of the 2014 Constitution was amended in a referendum on constitutional
amendments to provide for the creation of a higher council that collects all the judicial institutions
in it.127 This amendment provided for the establishment of the Higher Council of Judicial Entities
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and Bodies. The Higher Council is presided by the President of the Republic and the membership
of the Minister of Justice, the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the President of the
Cassation Court, the President of the State Council, the President of the Cairo Court of Appeal,
the Public Prosecutor, the President of State Lawsuits Authority, the President of Administrative
Prosecution Authority and the President of the Military Judiciary Authority as well as the
Secretary-General of the Council who is ex officio the First Assistant to the Minister of Justice.
The higher council has existed since 2008 under law no. 192 of 2008, but the 2014 constitutions
did not provide for this council in its texts, so, a constitutional amendment was needed to revive
the council. The Higher Council’s main objective, as stated by the Parliament's Legislative
Committee in its report, is to coordinate and deliberate on common affairs between judicial entities
and bodies and it does not in any way affect the independence of the judiciary. Rather, it is an
organizational council that carries out coordination matters between judicial institutions.
There is a distinction between judicial entities and judicial bodies. Judicial entities are the entities
that are functioned with settling disputes by rendering court judgments such as: the Supreme
Constitutional Court, the State Council, the Court of Cassation, and the Cairo Court of Appeal (the
ordinary judiciary), as well as the Military Judiciary, as shown in figure (1). While judicial bodies
are the bodies that perform judicial work however they do not render judgments in legal disputes
such as: the Public Prosecution Authority, the Administrative Prosecution Authority, as well as
the State Lawsuits Authority, as shown in figure (2).

republic for a period of time specified by the law. In the absence of the president of the republic, he shall
be replaced temporarily by who he authorizes from among the heads of the judicial authorities.
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Figure (1) The judicial entities in the 2019 Higher Council for Judicial Entities and Bodies.
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Figure (2) The judicial bodies in the 2019 Higher Council for Judicial Entities and Bodies.
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Since its establishment or its revival, the Higher Council has made many accomplishments,128 such
as: achieving quick and effective justice, developing the judicial work system, especially with
regard to the expansion of building new courts and the adoption of modern electronic and digital
systems, also the provision of continuous training programs necessary for the new members of
judicial entities and bodies, as well as strengthening the role of women in the judiciary, besides
advancing the bodies assisting the judiciary.
In one of the meetings of the Higher Council presided by the President of the Republic, on 2 June
2021,129 historic decisions were declared, among them was the promotion of equality between men
and women in the judiciary by starting to appoint women at the State Council and the Public
Prosecution as of the 1st of October 2021. This decision was issued after decades of discrimination
against women and despite many lawsuits filed from young women fresh law graduates against
this discrimination. In the implementation of the historic decision of the Higher Council to appoint
women, and on the 5th of March 2022, the courts of the Council of State have seen the first female
judges sitting on the bench in a historic moment.130
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We shall reach here an important conclusion, that the Egyptians would have never seen women
sitting on the bench, after decades of struggling for their rights and decades of discrimination
against them, except after the existence of the Higher Council that includes members of the
Executive branch of government, mainly the President of the Republic and the Minister of Justice.
The latter is always a judge who is chosen among working or retired judges. This supports the
argument of the importance of balancing the judiciary’s wide autonomy with some degree of
accountability, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
The historic decision of appointing women in the State Council and the Public Prosecution was
implemented in two phases, the first phase is by the immediate appointment of women in the two
judicial institutions by the way of transfer from the other two judicial institutions, from the
Administrative Prosecution that includes women as 43% of its total members, and from the State
Litigation Authority that includes women as 20% of its members.131 The second phase is through
allowing women to apply from the young law school fresh graduates, thus attaining full equality
between men and women in the justice system, as these two institutions abstained for decades to
appoint women as judges and prosecutors at the beginning of the judicial career path. Regarding
the first phase of immediate appointment,132 11 female members were transferred from the courts
of the ordinary judiciary to hold senior positions in the Public Prosecution, in addition to 98 female
members who were transferred from the Administrative Prosecution and the State Lawsuits to be
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judges in the Council of State. While regarding the second phase,133 on 27 January 2022, the
Council of State, and for the first time since 1946, announced the acceptance of a new batch of
law school fresh graduates of 2021 that includes women. Also, on 31 January 2022, the Public
Prosecution announced the acceptance of young women fresh law graduates.
To add another accomplishment, the Higher Council succeeded in decreasing the time required for
appointing new batches of law school graduates,134 thus in the last two years, the Egyptian judicial
institutions appointed new members more than before, and they launched appointment
announcements and competitions on a successive basis and a fast manner parallel with the new
batches graduated annually. Thus, the State Lawsuits Authority announced its recruitment
competition on 15 January 2022, and the Administrative Prosecution announced its recruitment
competition on the 29th of January 2022. On 12 March 2022, the State Council began conducting
interviews for 2021 female and male graduates together for the first time in history.135 However,
there is no specified date for the appointment, and this is one of the issues I addressed in the reform
project in chapter 3, I propose that there must be a transparent and clear appointment process with
a specific timeline.
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Furthermore,136 the Higher Council has many achievements, one of them is unifying the
leaderships of the judicial institutions in one council. Other advantages are, firstly, setting the
conditions for appointment in the judicial institutions on the basis of competence, merit, and
eligibility, and in a manner that guarantees equality and fairness. Secondly, non-repetition of the
names of those accepted for appointment in more than one judicial institution, this decision helps
in increasing other candidates’ opportunities for access to judicial positions after preventing reappointment of one candidate in more than one judicial institution. Thirdly, providing the State
Litigation Authority with the reasons for not accepting the applicants for judicial positions in the
other three judicial institutions, to submit them to the courts in the pending cases. This decision
allows transparency to know the reasons for excluding some of the applicants for judicial positions.
1. The Judiciary’s Reluctance to Reform Judicial Appointment
The judiciary is used to be a catalyst for transparency compared to other branches of government,
however, it sometimes resists the creation of transparency and accountability standards for its
practices.137 Judiciaries around the world usually resist any attempt to reform due to their
conservative nature. According to Shabbir, judicial institutions usually lack the true will to reform
on a long-term basis, suggesting that reform programs shall be encouraged by the public and civil
society.138 Similarly, according to Aziz, any reform to the judicial appointment and accountability
shall face resistance from the judiciary as the majority of Egypt’s judges do not want to risk their
material and status interests.139 One of these interests is the nepotistic practices in the judicial
appointments as we explained previously.
Thus, the judiciary resists any sort of reform of judicial appointment and judicial training, as the
reform will put the judiciary's nepotism and non-transparency practices under public scrutiny. The
judiciary prefers to maintain a “status quo” that had evolved over decades and is unwilling to
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support wide reforms that held it accountable for its actions whether to the public or to the other
branches of government.
One of the most remarkable manifestations of the Egyptian judicial unwillingness and resistance
to reform is the insistence on the outdated system of judicial appointment. The current appointment
system shows how the high boards of the judicial institutions adopt antique methods for appointing
judges and prosecutors.140 This is to protect the majestic position of the judiciary as well as protect
the discriminating practices in the judicial appointment. We shall display two famous examples
that support this argument.
i. The Two Prominent Examples of Judges’ Reluctance to Reform Judicial Appointment
Judges are as flawed as any other sect when it comes to selecting new members. This may happen
for many reasons, one of them is that judges may have their interests arising from the bureaucratic
nature of the profession, the other reason is that judges may believe that they are the only people
who can properly select new judges.141
Two prominent examples manifest judicial reluctance to any reform, especially in the judicial
appointment system. The first example is in 2005, when the judicial nepotistic appointment
practices led many observers and analysts to criticize them142 such as the well-known writer
Farouq Gweda, who wrote in Al-Ahram, a widely nation newspaper, about the judicial nepotism
and the ‘social non-fitness’ that prevented some candidates to be appointed in the judiciary, in a
reference to the exclusion of lower socio-economic candidates from the appointment. Gweda’s
article made a huge echo in Egyptian society.143 Thus, instead of addressing such an issue, the
Supreme Judicial Council which is the high board that has the authority to appoint judges and
prosecutors in the Ordinary Judiciary and the Public Prosecution, decided to backlash against
Gweda and ignored his demands to reform the judicial appointment process and put clear and
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transparent criteria to ensure fairness and justice. Furthermore, the Public Prosecution held
investigations with him that lasted for 6 hours for ‘flouting the Judiciary’ and causing damage to
the image of the judiciary among the public. However, the Minister of Justice at that time
Mamdouh Marei published later an apology to Gweda in the newspapers for initiating an
investigation with him.144
The second example is in 2007, when the judicial appointments including sons and daughters of
judiciary members increased intensively without considering their academic degrees and this, in
turn, violates the principle of equality.145 Paradoxically, the reform of the appointing criteria was
initiated by the executive which took the reforming initiative, and Law No 17 of 2007 was issued
with the approval of the Parliament.146 The amending law raised the requirement of the overall
academic grade from “pass” to “good”. The reform aimed to guarantee equality and end nepotism
and favoritism which occurred during the judicial appointments. Judges considered such reform
as a fight against them.147
ii. The Struggle of Women to Sit on the Bar
There was discrimination against women and abstention from appointing them for decades in the
two judicial institutions; the State Council and the Public Prosecution. To illustrate more, the first
time in which the issue of discrimination against women in applying to the judiciary occurred was
in 1949, when Aisha Rateb, a law school graduate, applied to be a judge in the State Council. She
made the application following the State Council's announcement for vacancies. The State Council
rejected her appointment. Accordingly, she filed lawsuit no. 33 for the year 4 before the
Administrative Court challenging the decision of the State Council.148 The Administrative Court
issued its judgment in 1952 and rejected the case.149 The Administrative Court ruled that Rateb’s
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exclusion by the state council was not based on legal or cultural considerations, and hence did not
breach the principle of equality. Moreover, the state council has the discretionary power to choose
whomever it sees fit for the position based on its assessment of the circumstances.150 Since then,
the State Council and the Public Prosecution are rejecting the appointment of women as members
in both judicial institutions.
The discrimination against women continued until 2010 when the State Council announced
accepting applications from women to apply as judges for the first time.151 However, this decision
faced major opposition from the State Council’s General Assembly which annulled the decision
of the Special Board.152 Moreover, Egypt ratified 1981 the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) by the Presidential Decree No 434 of 1981.
Also, the laws regulating both the Public Prosecution and the State Council do not specify that the
position of judge has to be occupied by a person of the male sex. Besides, on 14 March 2010, the
Supreme Constitutional Court issued its explanation decision stating that women are
constitutionally and legally able to serve as judges.153 The Court ruled that the term “Egyptian”
which is mentioned as a condition for being a judge in both laws, encompasses both male and
female Egyptians. However, some judges considered the Supreme Constitutional Court ruling as
an act of interference in the State Council’s affairs.154
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There were various allegations for the abstention from appointing women on the judicial bench,
some of these allegations are: Some judges stated that Islamic Sharia and the political
circumstances are against appointing women as judges.155 They added that the constitution does
not “oblige” the judiciary to appoint women on the bench. Moreover, a former State Council
President, indicated that there is a difficulty in having women working as public prosecutors or
heads of courts because of the difficulty of them going to crime sites and holding criminal
investigations.156 Besides, a former member of the Supreme Judicial Council pointed out it is not
desirable for a woman to work in the Public Prosecution,157 as working as a public prosecutor
requires great hardship that the woman may not be able to perform well.
In January 2014, the Egyptian Constitution was amended, it provides in article 9 that the state shall
ensure equal opportunities for all citizens without discrimination, also article 11 explicitly grants
women the right to be appointed in all the judicial institutions without discrimination. Article 14
states that public offices are a competence-based right for all citizens without bias or favoritism.
Besides, article 53 criminalizes discrimination. Consequently, in March 2014, Omnia Gadallah, a
female law graduate batch 2013 with the highest degree “Excellent with Merit”, applied to serve
as a judge in the State Council. Omnia filed a judicial appeal (No. 20222 for the year 2016) before
the State Council courts challenging the abstention of the State Council to admit her judicial
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application, but her appeal was dismissed citing the lack of eligibility of women to be appointed.158
Therefore despite all the previous constitutional entitlements to appoint women on the bench, the
Public Prosecution and the State Council ignored all the previous international conventions, laws,
and judgments and decided to abstain from appointing women.
However, ironically, on the 8th of March 2021,159 which marks the international women’s day,
President of the Republic Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi directed Minister of Justice Judge Omar Marwan
to coordinate with the judicial institutions to allow women to become members of the State Council
and the Public Prosecution.160 The presidential directives came to fully enforce the constitutional
entitlement of ensuring equality and non-discrimination against women particularly in these two
judicial institutions. According to the statement of the Ministry of Justice, the directive aims to
ensure that women can access different positions and achieve success in the judiciary. The Justice
Ministry added that it started communicating with both judicial institutions to put the president’s
directives into force.161 What is ironic in this matter, is the reaction of judges, as the first reaction
came on the following day to the presidential directives, on 9 March, when the spokesman for the
Judges Club, confirmed that the governing board of the Judges Club appreciated the directives of
President Al-Sisi of fully ‘activating’ the text of Article 11 of Egypt’s 2014 Constitution.162
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2. The Status of the Egyptian Judiciary in the 2014 Constitution with respect to
Independence and Accountability
Any attempt for reform is met by the Egyptian judges with the banner of protecting the principle
of judicial independence. They use such a principle as a tactic to resist and hinder any kind of
judicial reform. An Australian commentator explains that judiciaries worship and idolize the
principle of judicial independence.163 Judges usually use this ‘trumping' principle of judicial
independence as a powerful tactic while resisting any judicial reform.164
i. The Concepts of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability
‘Judicial independence is not freedom to do as a judge pleases, but rather, freedom to do what a
judge should. Some kind of oversight remains necessary.’ 165
Unfortunately,166 there is no universally agreed definition of the principle of judicial independence,
and this led to great difficulty in evaluating the claim that particular practice, such as judicial
training, undermines judicial independence.167
We shall discuss two concepts of judicial independence that help us in our analysis of the status of
the Egyptian judiciary in respect of judicial independence and judicial accountability.
Firstly, judicial independence and judicial accountability have frequently been viewed as
competing forces that need to be counterbalanced against one another.168 According to Handberg,
in the United States,169 the public debate regarding judicial selection methods is driven by two
divergent values: judicial independence and judicial accountability. The principle of judicial
independence limits the types of actions that can be taken against the judiciary to ensure that justice
is delivered in an impartial way and fair manner.170 In this sense, judicial independence requires
that judges shall be immune from other branches of government's discipline, however, this does
163
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not dismiss the possibility of any kind of external supervision of the judiciary.171 This means that
there must be some kind of judicial accountability that can ensure that the judiciary is welladministrating the justice system. In fact, an inclusive approach to the application of the principle
of judicial accountability may reinforce judicial independence. Thus, judicial independence and
accountability do not seem to be contradictory and can coexist together.172
Secondly, the principle of judicial independence is not an abstract principle.173 Common values,
such as ‘judicial independence’ have significantly different meanings in different judicial
cultures.174 This indicates that it must be viewed as a response to specific issues in each country.175
Thus, the significance of judicial independence differs from one country to another depending on
the history of attacks on the judiciary in that country. As a result, Siri Gloppen warns that when
assessing a judiciary’s independence, the background of the country is crucial.176 In other words,177
to decide how the judiciary exercises its judicial independence and accountability, consideration
should be given to the circumstances of a country’s national politics, culture, and legal
background.178 For a simple and quick illustration, we have Spain and Sweden as clear examples.
In Spain, the memory of Franco’s dictatorship, as well as earlier periods of authoritarian rule, has
made the current Spanish system very radical in its approach to limiting political involvement in
judicial selection. In Sweden, on the other hand, the judiciary’s steady and relatively peaceful
progress as an independent force has left many ties with the government exist.179 By applying this
to Egypt’s judicial system, the Egyptian judges have been subjected to various attacks and
interference from the executive because of the authoritarian framework in which Egypt’s judiciary
has worked since its establishment.180 Also, the Egyptian judiciary has battled executive intrusions
bravely for more than a century.
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Having mentioned the above, this leads us to the reason for the exclusive complete independence
status granted to the Egyptian judiciary in the 2014 constitution. This special status made some
researchers in the field of judicial reform describe the independence given to the Egyptian judiciary
as not equivalent to its counterparts around the world.181
ii. The Independence and Accountability of Egypt’s Judiciary in the 2014 Constitution
According to the democratic structure of states, government powers are distributed among the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches to avoid the concentration and misuse of power.
Competitive cooperation of the three branches creates in the end horizontal accountability.182
However, the texts of Egypt’s 2014 constitution that regulate the judiciary do not deal with the
present challenges facing the Egyptian judiciary such as the lack of quick delivery of justice, court
inefficiency, poor judicial training, and nepotism in the judicial appointment.183 The status of the
Egyptian judiciary in the 2014 Constitution has two characteristics which are, firstly: full
independence with no accountability, secondly: Egypt’s Judiciary is autonomous and not
independent.
The first characteristic is that the Egyptian judiciary in the 2014 constitution enjoys full
independence with no accountability. The judicial independence in Egypt has a special status other
than any country in the world.184 This happened because the Constituent Assembly that drafted the
2014 constitution left the drafting of the articles related to the judiciary to the wishes of judicial
leaders as this was the only aim that concerned judges to protect their sectoral interests.185 So the
constitutional articles relating to the judiciary are a reflection of the judicial institutions’ sectoral
interests and not a reflection of the hopes of the Egyptians.186 The Constituent Assembly

181

Egypt’s 2014 Constitution, Article 193, which gives absolute power to the SCC in choosing its
members, making it the first constitutional court in the world, which has this kind of power. This is before
amending the article in a constitutional referendum in 2019 allowing the President of the Republic to
select the SCC chief justice
182
See Sahar F. Aziz, supra note 71, at 5.
183
See El Chazli, supra note 123, at 9.
184
See El Chazli, supra note 123, at 8.
185
Id.
186
Ahmed Rabie et al., MOUSSA YATAcHAD LEL-QODAH BE-DERASET MOQTRAHAT-HEM LEWADcHA FĪ AL-DOSTOUR .. W AL-ZEND: NABHATH cN MASLHETT AL-WATAN, Moussa pledges to
the judges to study their proposals to put them in the constitution .. And Al-Zind: We are looking for the
nation’s interest, El-Watan News, (20 September 2013). Retrieved from:
https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/326509
37

intervened many times to ease tensions and settle conflicts between judicial entities and bodies
when the interests of these institutions were conflicting.187
The second characteristic of the status of the Egyptian judiciary in the 2014 constitution indicates
that Egypt’s Judiciary is too autonomous and not independent. Judicial independence means there
are checks and balances between the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of
government, this means that the judiciary is not above the other two branches; instead, it is equal
and accountable to both. While judicial autonomy means building blocks and obstacles between
the three branches.188 Autonomy indicates that each state institution is performing its constitutional
powers in isolated islands.189 There is a big risk of having a very autonomous judicial branch.
Although an autonomous judiciary has many advantages for democracy,190 it also has some
drawbacks. This status risks replacing the rule of law with the rule of judges. What I mean here by
the rule of law is to set objective and transparent criteria for judicial appointments.
According to Nathalie,191 in the recent years the Egyptian judges were able to gain more autonomy
with no oversight and no checks on their authority. Their independence has increased their
‘isolation’ from the state and society and no justice reform has been made.192 Increased judicial
independence may appear as a positive development toward good governance. However,
according to some analysts, in a country like Egypt, increasing judicial independence before
initiating comprehensive reform makes it more difficult to improve the judicial system.193 The full
autonomy that the Egyptian judiciary has gained in the 2014 Constitution makes it very difficult
to be checked or held accountable either to the public or to other branches.194 This makes judges
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accountable to each other only and in turn decreases the level of public confidence in the judiciary.
The status of the Egyptian judicial accountability affirms that the judiciary has become a kind of
syndicalism which is like a corporate group function in separation from everything else.195
Risley while analyzing the Egyptian judicial independence stated that the ‘people will not support
a judicial aristocracy and the government will not support a judicial autocracy’ if the rule of law
descends into the rule of judges.196 The accountability of Egypt’s judiciary is questionable because
judges are not appointed in a manner that is based on merit. There is a lack of transparency in the
selection process. Moreover, many judges are not competent due to the lack of effective judicial
training. There are negative results of the practices performed by the judiciary and one of the most
important unfortunate consequences is the judiciary’s loss of public confidence.
Therefore, reform is greatly needed that can balance judicial independence – or we can say judicial
autonomy – with judicial accountability. This reform shall establish a mechanism of accountability
for the judiciary. Judicial independence and accountability “are not at odds with each other but are
rather different sides of the same coin”.197 Also, for courts to function effectively, people must
have confidence in judges.198 This confidence is promoted when there is a fair and transparent
system of judicial appointment. Thus, there must be clear and defined criteria in all stages of the
appointment process. These criteria must be published and declared to the public and the
candidates for judicial posts.
3. The Comparative Systems of Higher Councils for Judiciary
As I expressed before, the quality of newly appointed judges in Egypt is not up to the standards.
This is mainly because the Egyptian law schools are offering traditional legal education which has
been repeatedly accused of failing to prepare judges for the new and challenging responsibilities
that modern society is assigning to them.199 This also was the case in the European continental
judiciaries after the second world war.200 In many justice systems in Europe there was a tendency
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to reinforce the judiciary's external independence, particularly in relation to the executive.201 As a
response, these two reasons led to the creation of higher councils of the judiciary charged with
making all decisions affecting the status of judges, apart from the executive interference, as well
as the establishment of specialized centers for judicial training in many countries, and the latter
will be discussed shortly in the comparative systems of judicial schools.
Here I shall demonstrate the comparative systems of higher councils for judiciaries. I will focus
on judiciaries of European civil law countries as they are very similar to a large extent to Egypt’s
legal and judicial systems. The subject of my analysis includes mainly France, Spain, and Italy in
addition to other European civil law countries. I intend to use this analysis in my counter-argument
that the Higher Council is not threatening Egypt’s judicial independence.
Over the decades, the world has seen a clear rise in judicial power and an increasing participation
of judges in the administration of judiciaries.202 In Italy, the judicial system is known for its
extreme independence, in which the judicial council controls all affairs of judicial governance.
This is similar to its Egyptian counterpart. According to Garoupa & Ginsburg, judicial councils
sustain as institutions because they include actors from different fields of the society, where no
one institution can easily be in control of the judiciary.203 The judicial councils help to equalize
independence and accountability in the judiciary. Therefore, judicial councils are often the targets
of institutional reform such as in Italy and Brazil.204
Similar to France, Egypt adopts the collegiate or panel system that allows the new judges to act as
advisors, and this allows them to gain practical professional training over the course of their
careers. Their exercise of the judicial function is reduced under the lead of senior experienced
judges in the panel until they become able to practice their judicial functions properly. Also similar
to France,205 Egypt’s judges (the Ordinary Judiciary) and prosecutors (the Public Prosecution)
belong to the same profession and the same institution. Also, administrative courts (the State
Council) form part of the Egyptian judicial system but with different leadership or administration,
unlike in France, in which administrative courts are not part of the French judicial system.
201

Id.
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial
Independence, The Am. J. of Comp. L., 203 (2009).
203
Id. at 228.
204
Id.
205
See Guarnieri, supra note 33, at 170.
202

40

In the following table (1), I compare the judicial councils in Egypt, France, Italy, and Spain as
regard the number of the members, the presidency of the council, the number of members from
inside the judiciary as well as the number of members outside it.

Table 1 - Judicial Councils in Egypt, France206, Italy207 and Spain208
Country

Egypt

France

Italy

Spain

11

22

27

21

No. of members
Presidency

Ex officio members

President of the

President of the

President of the

President of the

Republic

Court of Cassation

Republic

Supreme Court

All of the 10

Public Prosecutor at

- First President of

members

the Court of

the Court of

Cassation

Cassation
- Attorney General
at the Court of
Cassation

No. of members of
the judiciary:

6 judges
6 prosecutors

16 elected by their

12 elected by the

colleagues

Parliament

elected/appointed
No. of members

1 member of the

8 law professors or

4 law professors or

from outside the

Council of State

lawyers elected by

lawyers elected by

Judiciary

1 lawyer

the Parliament in a

the Congress of

joint session

Deputies

2 by the President of
the Republic

4 law professors or

2 by the President of

lawyers elected by

the National Assembly

the Senate

2 by the President of
the Senate
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The previous table (1) shows some facts that we must analyze. Regarding the ratio of judges and
non-judges members in the comparative Judicial Councils, judges constitute the majority of
Judicial Councils but not necessarily the consensus, as we can see the ratio of judges and nonjudges members in France (14 out of 22 members), in Italy (16 out of 27), and in Spain (12 out of
21). Also,209 Romania (10 out of 19), Slovenia (6 out of 11). However, in Belgium (22 out of 44)
the ratio is equal and the same is applied in Slovakia.
Regarding the mechanism of checks-and-balances among the three arms of governments, the
Parliament appoints some members in France, Italy, and Spain. The same is in Bulgaria and
Slovakia. The President of the Republic appoints 2 members in France, while in Italy the Judicial
Council is presided by the President of the Republic, and also in Malta. The Minister of Justice is
a member of the Council in Romania, Poland, and Latvia. Regarding non-judge members of
Judicial Councils, they may be lawyers as in France, Italy, and Spain, in addition to Belgium,
Malta, Denmark, and Sweden. They may be also law professors such as in France, Italy, and Spain,
besides, Belgium, Croatia, and Slovenia.210
Furthermore, many international and regional instruments state that Judicial Councils shall consist
of a majority of judges and may include political members whether from the Executive or the
Legislature. such as: the Universal Charter of the Judge adopted by the International Association
of Judges (IAJ) in 1999,211 the Dublin Declaration on Standards for the Recruitment and
Appointment of Members of the Judiciary in 2012,212 and the Budapest Resolution on Self
Governance for the Judiciary: Balancing Independence and Accountability in 2008.213 Other
instruments that call clearly for the mixed composition of the higher councils are namely: the Kyiv
Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia
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regarding Judicial Administration, Selection and Accountability adopted in 2010,214 besides the
Opinion no.10 (2007) of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE),215 which provides
that mixed composition has two advantages such as preventing the perception of self-interest and
cronyism and the other advantage is reflecting the different viewpoints within society, thus giving
the judiciary an additional source of legitimacy. Another instrument that calls for mixed formation
is the Venice Commission Report on Judicial Appointments,216 this instrument states that a mixed
formation creates a balance between judicial independence and the necessary judicial
accountability, thus, avoiding the negative effects of corporatism within the judiciary.
In Conclusion, the argument stating that the Higher Council is threatening judicial independence
has no solid ground, as such council does not necessarily threaten this independence. Moreover,
this argument can be countered by what Bogdanor is stating. Bogdanor makes an important
distinction between "sacrificial" and "explanatory" accountability.217 In sacrificial accountability,
the institution is subject to the oversight of another. While in explanatory accountability, the
institution is examined by another body thus, the institution under examination or oversight is
obliged to increase transparency in its exercise of public powers, and transparency is vital for the
good governance of any country.218 Thus, not leaving the exercise of public powers to its own free
will may be flawed because of corporate interests. This is very clear in the example of depriving
women of judgeship. The judiciary’s reaction to any call for appointing women was that the
judiciary is the master of its own decision and has its wide discretionary power to decide whether
to appoint women or not, and this led to dismissing cases filed by young women who applied to
judicial positions and the most prominent two examples are Aisha Rateb and Omnia Gadallah.
Now, I shall refer to the NTA and the discourse that it is considered a threat to the independence
of the judiciary.
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B. The National Training Academy (NTA)
The NTA was established by the presidential decree no. 434 of the year 2017 as one of the
recommendations of the first National Youth Conference held in Sharm El Sheikh in December
2016.219 In fact, the NTA was originally established as a national center for training and qualifying
young Egyptian leaders in all fields and all governmental sectors. The NTA’s main goal is to
achieve human development requirements for the youth in all sectors of the state and upgrade their
abilities and skills.220 However, the different judicial institutions piled up to conduct training
programs for their new members at the NTA. Since its establishment in 2017, the NTA provided
training programs to the assistants of the Minister of Justice, judges of the Economic Courts, judges
of the State Council, members of the State Lawsuits Authority, members of the Administrative
Prosecution, Public Prosecutors, as well as the first 11 female prosecutors in the history of the
Public Prosecution.221
The NTA held many training programs for the members of the judiciary, such as the State
Council,222 the State Lawsuits Authority,223 and the Administrative Prosecution.224 The NTA
performs this role of training judiciary members despite the existence of the NCJS and the different
training centers established in the judicial institutions. However, the Minister of Justice stated that
219
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each judicial institution has a center for training members on the legal aspects,225 but the legal part
in the qualification is not adequate and there must be also cultural, and managerial aspects. Thus,
courses include strategic planning and project management. These types of courses were offered
to senior judges who act as assistants to the Minister of Justice.
The NTA has gained, since its establishment in 2017, the opportunity to handle the responsibility
of training judges and prosecutors and other members of the judicial institutions, this is besides its
responsibility to train civil servants working in the leading governmental institutions. This is
mainly because of the delay and sometimes the failure of the five judicial training centers, found
in the four judicial institutions, to properly train and educate new and current judges. The Public
Prosecution concluded a cooperation protocol with the NTA, aimed at upgrading the work
capabilities of the Public Prosecution members and administrators, enhancing and developing their
scientific and administrative skills in various fields to keep pace with the developments of the
modern judiciary.226 The Administrative Prosecution and State Lawsuits Authorities were also
keen to conclude a cooperation protocol with the NTA, to refine and develop the expertise and
capabilities of their members to keep pace with all legal, administrative, and technical
developments, provide the requirements for achieving effective justice, control the administrative
work system, and establish the values and standards of accountability, integrity, and
transparency.227
However, it is important to mention that the board of trustees of the NTA is very much executive
dominated and there is no judicial representation. The board is under the presidency of the
President of the Republic and the membership of the Prime Minister,228 the Minister of Planning
and Economic Development, the President of the General Intelligence Authority, a representative
of the Ministry of Finance, a representative of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific
Research, a representative of the Supreme Council of Universities, as well as five experts from the
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educational field with no one specialized in the legal education.229 This too much executivedominated board reinforces my argument that the NTA is not appropriate nor ideal for training
judges and prosecutors, as it may threaten judicial independence. Thus, an independent school
should be created.
Also, I will support my argument by analyzing the comparative systems of the judicial schools that
are responsible for appointing and training judges. Again, as I did regarding the higher councils, I
will focus on judiciaries of European civil law countries as they are very similar to a large extent
to Egypt’s legal and judicial systems. The subject of my analysis includes mainly France and Spain
in addition to other European civil law countries. The analysis consists of three sections, which
are: the first section is an overview of the comparative judicial schools and highlights the process
of appointing and training judges at the ENM in France, where I intend to benefit from the French
successful experience in appointing and training judges and prosecutors. The second section
analyzes the leadership and the governing boards of the French Judicial School and the Spanish
Judicial School, where I intend to show that the body responsible for appointing and training judges
shall be independent and must include a majority of judges in its governing board along with nonjudicial members such as law academia and law practitioners.
1. The Importance of Judicial Leadership and Judicial Ownership of Judicial Training
Many judiciaries make further efforts to promote judge-led learning or the judicial ownership of
their training programs, recognizing that this is vital for preserving judicial independence and
promoting the programs’ credibility. Judge-led training indicates that judges should be the leaders
of their own training. It reflects a belief that professionals in general, and judges in particular, are
the best deciders of their own learning needs and how to satisfy them.
There is an international debate throughout the judiciaries whether judicial training should be
mandated to an outside body or should be led by the judiciary.230 Some analysts see that imposing
judicial training from outside the judiciary is considered to weaken judges’ voluntary participation
and their motivation to learn. However, other analysts and jurists see that a judge-led training has
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a risk of being blind to discovering basic deficiencies of the judicial system, and maybe blind to
deciding the training programs needed to address such deficiencies.231
Experience demonstrates that while judges know their own training needs, however, they can only
assess half of the training needs. The other half can be provided by the lawyers, the law academia,
the civil sector, other members of the private legal profession, and other interested stakeholders.
Therefore, non-judicial experts should design the curriculum of the judicial training and deliver
the programs under the supervision and assistance of judges.232 In other words, it should be a
partnership between judges and educational and behavioral experts.
Also, it is preferable to deliver the judicial training programs in an institutionalized structure.233
Moreover, it is essential that the judicial training institution is at the heart of the judiciary and must
be in close contact with the judiciary. This is to increase the training’s efficiency.234 Also, the
governing body of the institution responsible for judicial training should include judges as this
helps to strengthen the link between that institution and the judiciary. To prove that the school’s
credibility helps judges to be in conditions convenient for learning, and support them to continue
their training all over their career paths, I will mention another example that is the French ENM,
as the ENM is the institution that is training all judges in France, whether through initial or
continuing training. So, this made the ENM become the home of French judges and prosecutors,
a place much appreciated by them, where they can take a break from their normal judicial duties
for a few days, and spend time for reflection and discussion with their peers.
Also, in contributing to solving the issue of the training body for the Egyptian judiciary, I will spot
the light on an example from Australia. In Australia, the establishment of the Judicial Commission
to offer judicial training was at first objected to by judges as it may interfere with judicial
independence. However, the law was amended to establish the Judicial Commission as a body
independent of the Executive with judicial participation in the training program.235From the
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previously mentioned, there should be a balance between judicial ownership of training programs
and the vital need for the induction of out-sider components.
To conclude, studying global governance structures for judicial training reveals that it is very
important that the judiciary leads and owns its training institution.236 Regarding judicial leadership,
judges and prosecutors who are experienced and represent various categories within the judiciary
should lead the training body, with the membership of members from the government, educational
experts, and law academia and law practitioners. While regarding judicial ownership, it is
important that the judges take part in the faculty of trainers and instructors of the training body.
Outside training for judges risks creating barriers to effective judicial learning.
Moreover, many international and regional instruments call for the judicial leadership and judicial
ownership of judicial training, as article 4-2 of the Universal Charter of the Judge adopted by the
International Association of Judges (IAJ), as well as Opinion no 4 of the Consultative Council of
European Judges (CCJE) to the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
on appropriate initial and in-service training for judges at national and European levels, state that
initial and in-service training shall be conducted under the supervision of the judiciary. Also, the
Sixth Principle of the Amsterdam Judicial Training Principles adopted by the European Judicial
Training Network (EJTN) states that judicial training should be delivered by judges and
prosecutors who have been trained for such purpose.’
2. The Comparative Systems of Judicial Schools
In European countries, there was a major change in judicial appointments, which is the
establishment of judicial schools to offer legal education and training for newly appointed
judges.237 In Egypt, this step is highly required to bridge the gap between legal education at the
university and professional work at the judiciary.
France is a pioneer in the field of judicial training, where the training of judges and prosecutors is
offered by the National School for the Judiciary, Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature (hereinafter
the ENM) which was established in 1970 under the Ministry of Justice, the ENM inherited the
functions of the National Centre for Judicial Studies established in 1958.238 The ENM’s goal is to
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make applying for the judiciary available to candidates from different professional environments.
I will explain the training process before and after the appointment at the ENM.
In France, the newly appointed judges should receive 2 years of theoretical and practical initial
judicial training. While as to the continuous judicial training, new judges shall take four months
of mandatory theoretical training during the first eight years of their appointment. Following this,
judges may participate in voluntary continuous training sessions held by the ENM.239
The French judicial applicants must pass two examinations. The first examination is made for law
school fresh graduates holding at least a bachelor's degree or license. Centers of judicial studies
attached to main universities offer preparatory courses for the examination two times a year and
economic aid is offered to those who enroll in such courses.240 The second examination is made
for government and military officials, who have at least four years of public service. Holding a
law degree is not a must for admission to the ENM and a preparatory course is offered to applicants
without law degrees, who pass special admission tests.241
At the ENM, the subjects of the examinations are mainly law school subjects and sometimes legal
books may be used.242 There are four written tests, six oral tests on law, and the foreign language
test, besides the physical fitness tests. The applicants shall take the written tests and every test is
five hours long. Upon passing them, they shall take the six oral tests and each test lasts from 15 to
30 minutes.243 In order to assist the applicants in the preparation for the tests, the ENM publishes
samples of previous written exam questions in each subject in the ENM bulletin.
After admission to the ENM, students go through introductory theoretical training and shall take
internships in courts and prosecution offices to expose them to real-life situations.244 Students take
theoretical courses and internships in courts and law firms. The theoretical training is delivered
through modules that operate as seminars or workshops. Students are encouraged to make
dialogue, role-playing, and write judicial decisions.245 This phase focuses also on the practical and
procedural aspects of civil, criminal, and administrative law. Moreover, the school also offers
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specialized courses in law-related topics, such as legal medicine, psychiatry, psychology,
psychosociology, accounting, and foreign languages.246
This is followed by 15-month internships in which students may work in courts and prosecution
offices. After fifteen months, students take internships in public and private administrative offices
and carry out legal research.247 After the internships are completed, there are one written test and
two oral tests. The written test is about drafting a prosecutorial decision or statement and lasts for
six hours. The two oral tests last fifteen minutes each and consist of a presentation of a civil or
criminal case.248 These tests’ grades are added to those of the 15 months’ internships and are sent
to the President of the Republic to issue the Presidential decree of their appointment. The standard
practice is to assign the new judges in collegiate courts, to reduce the effect of any inexperienced
mistakes that may happen.249 After the new judges in France are appointed, they shall take the
mandatory last internship in a court or a prosecutor's office. This internship helps the newly
appointed judges or prosecutors to specialize in the positions of their appointment and gain the
necessary skills.250
My comparative analysis shows that the task of admitting candidates to judicial schools differs
from one country to another.251 In France, it is the Board of the ENM, dominated by the judges.
While in Romania, it is a special admissions board controlled by the Romanian judicial council
which consists of judicial members with representation from law academia, practitioners, and
representatives of the trainees at the school.
Concerning the leadership of the judicial schools and the body responsible for appointing and
training judges. I will display the organization of judicial schools in France and Spain to support
my argument that judicial schools must include a mix or a combination of judicial and non-judicial
members.
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3. The Leadership of the French Judicial School
The ENM board approves the regulations of the school and the subjects of the continuing training
program. The board also checks the budget regulations.252 Members of the ENM administrative
board as of the 16th of November 2020, are: Firstly, members with voting rights who are; 1) Four
ex officio members: The Chair is the Chief Justice of the Court of Cassation, and the Vice-Chair
is the Chief Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, Director of Judicial Services, and Director
General of the Administration and Civil Service.253 2) Nine members appointed by the Minister of
Justice including: the Director of Civil Affairs and Seals, three judges from different courts of
Appeal, one Public Prosecutor from a regional court, one member of the Council of State, one
judge from a commercial court, a lawyer from the Bar, Director of the National School of
Administration (ENA).254 3) Two members appointed by the Minister of Justice and Minister for
Education: Director of the Institute of Judicial Studies (IEJ) of Lyon, and professor at University
Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne.255 4) Eight elected members: representative of the training staff,
representative of the court training delegates, representative of the ENM staff. representative of
the internship center directors, and four representatives of the trainee judges and prosecutors as
follows: a man and a woman from the last class, and a man and a woman from the class before.256
Secondly, members with advisory roles: the Director of the ENM, and three representatives of the
judicial trade unions or professional bodies.257
4. The Leadership of the Spanish Judicial School
The Spanish Judicial School, set up as a selection and training center for judges, integrated into
the General Council of the Judiciary, aims to provide comprehensive and high-quality training to
members and applicants of the Judicial Career.258
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The Spanish judicial school Escuela Judicial Consejo General del Poder Judicial,259 is created
under a law passed on May 26, 1944, located in Madrid, and is functioning since 1950. The Spanish
judicial school has a broader mission than its French counterpart. The French judicial school trains
only judges and prosecutors. While the Spanish school since 1966, has been entrusted with the
mission to select and train all the public officials relevant to the Spanish justice system, such as:
judges, prosecutors, court clerks, and forensic physicians.260
In Spain, the Judicial School is a technical body of the General Council of the Judiciary El Consejo
General del Poder Judicial, and its essential mission is to coordinate the selection processes of
judges, as well as ensure the proper execution of initial training programs for them and their
continuous training, thus, the School administration is composed of: Directorate of Selection and
Initial Training, and the Directorate of Continuing Training.
To carry out its functions, the Spanish school is given the power to make cooperation agreements
with public or private institutions. Moreover, the School may offer training to Judges or applicants
to the judiciary from other countries. Three of the most prominent functions of the Spanish Judicial
School are: 1) the selection and initial training of applicants to enter the judiciary, as well as
carrying out activities aimed at facilitating access to the school itself. 2) the permanent training of
all the members of the judiciary and of all those who, without belonging to it, have to perform
juridical functions. 3) collaboration and exchange agreements with other similar foreign entities.
The members of the Governing Council are appointed for a period of three years.261 The Governing
Council of the Judicial School is made up of the President of the General Council of the Judiciary
as the chair, and of the following members: 1) Five members of the General Council of the
Judiciary appointed by the Plenary Session of the Council in which three members are from judges,
and the other two members are from lawyers and other jurists of recognized competence. 2) A
member appointed by the Ministry of Justice and the Interior. 3) A representative of the Prosecutor.
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4) Three members appointed by the Plenary Session of the General Council of the Judiciary at the
request of the professional associations of Judges.
To sum up, in France, the ENM administrative board contains nine members, including a lawyer,
appointed by the Minister of Justice, and two members from the academia appointed by the
Minister of Justice and the Minister for Education. While in Spain, the Governing Council of the
Spanish Judicial School includes a representative appointed by the Ministry of Justice and the
Interior. Thus, from this comparative analysis, it is obvious that the governing boards of both
judicial schools in both countries contain at least a member appointed by the Executive. Also, it is
very clear that the governing boards must include lawyers and law professors.
At the end of this chapter, I explained that some judges within the Egyptian judiciary are reluctant
to make any reform of the system of judicial appointments as this would affect their personal
interests in appointing their children and relatives. Also, they are reluctant to make any reform of
the system of judicial training as this would influence the status of hiring the least qualified
children and relatives. Reform of both systems will make the judiciary accountable to the public.
This judicial reluctance is demonstrated in this chapter by displaying two examples which are: the
2005 Farouq Gweda’s article criticizing the nepotism in judicial appointments, and the 2010 issue
of appointing women as judges in the State Council, then going through the ironic change of their
stance on appointing women as judges right after the Presidential directives in March 2021.
Moreover, I demonstrated the historical struggle of women to be appointed to the Council of State
and the Public Prosecution.
Then, I identified the relationship between judicial independence and judicial accountability, and
that the 2014 Constitution established a judiciary that rules without governmental or public checks,
in other words, it created an insulated judiciary above the law. The constitution of 2014 has
increased judges' autonomy. The judges managed to win this autonomy with little accountability
and with very few checks on their authority. Their autonomy has increased their isolation within
the state and society. Also, I concluded that the Higher Council is not threatening judicial
independence but rather creating a balance between judicial independence and judicial
accountability and this is because the Egyptian judiciary is too autonomous from the other arms of
government and also the public. I supported this argument by analyzing the comparative systems
of the composition of the higher judicial councils which include judges and non-judges. Also, the

53

international and regional instruments governing the independence of the judiciary state that the
inclusion of non-judicial members in the higher councils does not necessarily threaten judicial
independence. However, the formation of the Higher Council of Egypt needs to be modified.
Furthermore, I explained the establishment of the NTA and its expanding role in training members
of the different judicial institutions and its conflicting role with the already existing five
fragmented judicial training centers. Then, I spotted the light on the importance of judicial
leadership and judicial ownership of judicial training. Thus, I argued that the NTA is not
appropriate for training judges and prosecutors because of the much executive-dominated high
board and the absence of any judicial member. I supported my argument by studying the
comparative systems of judicial schools that are responsible for both appointment and training of
judges. I analyzed the training and appointment processes in the French judicial school (the ENM).
Then, I explained that the leadership and the governing boards of both the French and the Spanish
judicial schools, which are led by judges and have in their formations non-judicial members, and
both of them contain at least a member appointed by the Executive.
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IV. Egypt’s Judicial Reform in the Light of the Egyptian Experience, the
Comparative Systems, and the International Instruments
In chapter 2, I analyzed why the Egyptian judiciary is often resisting reform programs. This
resistance is based on the notion that such reform constitutes an act of interference from the
executive or the legislature thus threatening judicial independence. This Egyptian version of
judicial independence leads to the judiciary becoming immunized and untouchable. The judiciary
has become a sect with its own institutional and individual interests and not public servants.262
From the previously mentioned, it is no longer believable that the judiciary will reform itself from
within.263 As the judiciary is administrating its own affairs, no reform can take place except in the
case that judges themselves are willing and approving such reform.
The Egyptian judiciary still believes that any judicial reform should come from within the judiciary
itself to protect its independence. However, the judiciary is failing to reform the justice system
from within and especially the systems of appointment and training due to two reasons which are
namely: the corporate nature of Egypt’s judicial institutions, and the inefficiency and the outdating
of the systems of judicial appointment and judicial training. On the one hand, the sectarian or
corporate identity, that is spread among the Egyptian judicial institutions, was clear during the
debates on the texts of the 2014 constitution.264 At that time it was obvious that the judiciary itself
is not one of the branches of government and that every judicial institution is a distinct group or a
corporate that has great difficulty in communicating and coordinating with the other.265 The
Egyptian judiciary has a culture of corporate identity and ambition for independence within its
domain.266 This is maybe because the Egyptian judiciary as an institution has been working with
relative independence during authoritarian eras.267 However, this relative independence has
changed and became full independence in terms of personnel, budget, and administration. The only
way to address the disadvantages of the culture of ‘corporate identity’ within the judiciary is
through the creation of bridges and shared spaces between the different judicial institutions.268 This
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issue of corporate identity was addressed by the creation of the Higher Council, however, the
Higher Council’s formation needs to be modified which will be discussed shortly in this chapter.
On the other hand, the inefficiency and the outdating of the systems of judicial appointment and
judicial training are clear after displaying the flawed systems of judicial appointment and judicial
training. Thus, in this chapter, I am going to propose a reform project aiming to reform the systems
of judicial appointment and judicial training.
Therefore, chapter 3 will be divided into four main parts, the first main part is highlighting the
roles of judicial appointment and judicial training as agents for progress and development within
the justice system. In the second main part, I will explain the reform of judges’ mentality through
judicial training citing the Australian experience on this topic. Then, in the third main part, I
propose the modification of the formation of the Higher Council. Finally, in the fourth main part,
I propose a reform project to the systems of judicial appointment and judicial training. I begin the
reform project by highlighting the necessity of establishing an independent body for judicial
appointments. Finally, I end my reform project by proposing the creation of the National Academy
for the Judiciary (NJA), which is an independent body responsible for appointing and training
judges followed by some recommendations that must be endorsed in the NJA.
A. Judicial Appointment and Judicial Training as Agents for Progress
Reforming the systems of judicial appointment and judicial training will surely act as agents for a
wide and comprehensive reformist program. I will demonstrate the role of judicial appointment as
an agent for change and progress followed by the role of judicial training.
1. Reforming Judicial Appointment System promotes Diversity
On the one hand, the issue of judicial appointments is highly debatable in Egypt, where the
discriminating and nepotistic practices are expanding in judicial appointments. These practices led
to producing an inefficient judicial system and create negative effects concerning the public
confidence in the judiciary. Thus, the composition of the judiciary should reflect the diverse
composition of society. Article 2.13 of the 1982 Montreal Universal Declaration on the
Independence of Justice provides that 'the process and standards of judicial selection shall give
due consideration to ensuring a fair reflection by the judiciary of the society in all its aspects. The
judiciary as the guardian of the public rights and freedoms of the whole society shall represent and
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reflect the society fairly and effectively, through the so-called ‘fair reflection’.269 There are many
reasons why 'fair reflection,' should be a target in the judicial appointment.270 The fact that the
judiciary is one of the branches of the government and not just a dispute-resolution body, makes
it important that the judiciary must carefully reflect the society.271 Moreover, the fair reflection
will grant the judiciary public confidence.272 Diversity in the judiciary is encouraged, avoiding all
kinds of discrimination, although that does not necessarily imply the setting of quotas. This can be
found in the following international and regional instruments: 1) Dublin Declaration on Standards
for the Recruitment and Appointment of Members of the Judiciary (2012).273 2) Kyiv
Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia
regarding Judicial Administration, Selection and Accountability.274
On the other hand, judicial training can be used as an agent of change.275 Judicial training has a
reformative contribution to solving issues of gender discrimination in the judiciary. Education or
training is being used as a method for reform in the different judicial systems. “Education is for
development, and development entails change, so education is an agent for change”.276 Judicial
training prepares judges, both personally and institutionally, to deal with the issues and obstacles
they face. Thus, training is seen as a tool for progress.277
The judiciary is often resisting any kind of evolution or progress due to its conservative nature.
However, one of the most effective methods to deal with the conservative nature of the judiciary
is through judicial training. To explain further, we can put the example of the Australian justice
system.278 The establishment of the Australian Judicial Studies Board in 1979 was considered by
the Australian judges at that time as a threat to judicial independence. Partington, a retired member
of the Australian Judicial Studies Board has noted: “Twenty years ago, a majority of judges would
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have denied there was any need for judicial training. Today, only a minority would share that
view”.279
Also, in Australia,280 when it was suggested that the Judicial Studies Board be headed by a nonjudicial Director of Studies and is headquartered in a university, indicating that, although other
judges may provide the training, the Board does not need to be placed under the judges' close
supervision.281 These proposals were rejected on the grounds that the judges would not find the
training acceptable if the Board was run by an outsider on their behalf.282 In Britain, the idea of
creating continuing judicial education was completely alien to a properly appointed judiciary. Lord
Hailsham, for example, spoke out against what he called the ‘ignorant clamor’ in favor of the trend
that judges should receive specialized training.283
The project succeeded in Australia, because they amended the law and made the judicial training
owned and led by the judiciary. In Australia, the establishment of the Judicial Commission to offer
judicial training was at first objected to by judges as it may interfere with judicial independence.
However, the law was amended to establish the Judicial Commission as a body independent of the
Executive with judicial participation in the training program.
2. The Reform of Judges’ Mentality through Judicial Training
Despite the fact pace process of including women in the judiciary, there is a lot of work that still
needs to be done along the way. Despite the accomplishment of appointing fresh graduates women
at the Council of State and the Public Prosecution at the bottom of the judicial career path in both
institutions, however, these women may face discrimination in their career paths as the two
institutions abstained for decades from appointing women as peers to the male judges. The
persistent discrimination against women in the judicial appointment for decades gets us to the
influential conclusion of the need to reform judges’ mentality through judicial training, especially
as regards gender equality. The mentality of discrimination against women is rooted for decades
and needs to be addressed and tackled through continuing training that includes gender equality,
human rights, and inclusive and sustainable development.
279
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For a useful comparative example, we shall analyze the experience of the Australian government
to solve the issue of gender bias in the Australian justice system. The Chief Justice of Western
Australia released a report that provides several proposals aimed at eliminating gender inequality
in the judicial system where one of these proposals states that continuing education should be
mandatory.284 The report of the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Gender Bias and the
Judiciary stated that there was a problem of gender bias in the Australian legal system.285 The
report recommended that judges need to be aware of the realities of women's lives, to develop the
justice system to be more responsive to women and this can be done through judicial training.
Also, judicial training is one of the methods to solve the problem of discrimination in judicial
appointment training is one of the methods out of many methods. Another important method is to
set and announce clear criteria for appointment, thus ending discrimination and nepotism.”
B. The Modification of the Higher Council Formation
The formation of the Higher Council needs to be modified. According to Voermans, all judicial
councils have been created to serve as institutional bridges between the executive branch and
judicial branch of government, and their main goal is preserving judicial independence.286
Globally, the first judicial council was formed in the 1800s in France. Most civil code countries in
Europe and Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, formed judicial councils in the
second half of the twentieth century.287 The main goal of creating judicial councils is balancing
judicial independence with judicial accountability, also, there are two secondary goals which are:
improving judicial performance and administrative management.288 One of the most valuable
lessons learned from previous judicial reform programs around the world is that the judicial
council, like the judiciary itself, should be transparent and accountable.289 Also, there is a global
agreement among legal scholars and practitioners that judicial councils should have substantial
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representation of judges and not complete representation, and that judicial councils with broad
representation are more fair and independent. The solution to this obstacle will be discussed
shortly.
Consequently, after displaying the Egyptian Experience of the corporate identity of the judicial
institutions, and after studying the comparative systems regarding higher councils for the judiciary,
also, after considering the important role of the Higher Council in bridging the gaps whether
between the different judicial institutions or between them and the public as well as other branches
of government.
Having taking all the above into consideration, there is, however, a crucial modification that need
to be made to the formation of the Higher Council. The modification entails the injection of nonjudicial members such as well-known and eligible jurists from lawyers and law professors, as well
as eligible individuals from the civit society. The selection of these non-judicial members should
be given to the Parliament with its two chambers. The enrollment of non-judicial members to the
Higher Council is to ensure the presence of diverse stakeholders in justice governance.
The presence of members of the Executive, such as the President of the Republic and the Minister
of Justice, would be changed by excluding them from the formation, and give the President of the
Republic the right to appoint two members in the council who are non-judicial members, as this
right of appointment by the Executive is designed as one of the mechanisms of checks-andbalances to guarantee judicial efficiency and accountability, such as in the western European
countries.290 It also protects from the jeopardy of the corporate tendencies of a bureaucratic
judiciary which may lead to decreasing the guarantees of professional qualifications, as we have
displayed previously. Also, according to Garoupa & Ginsburg,291 the judicial councils sustain as
institutions because they include actors from different fields of the society, where no one institution
can easily be in control of the judiciary. Thus, in this way, judicial councils help to equalize
independence and accountability in the judiciary.
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C. Proposing the Most Appropriate Reform to Egypt’s Systems of Judicial Appointment and
Judicial Training
The significance of judicial training in civil law countries such as Egypt, France, and Italy lies in
the fact that new judges in both countries are fresh law school graduates who do not have enough
knowledge or experience in judicial and court procedures, thus, judicial schools offer training that
provides new judges with practical knowledge of judicial administration and gets them familiar
with the institutions with which they will work in the course of their careers.
Moreover, judges in bureaucratic judiciaries are generalists without experience in a specific area
of law, thus they cannot perform well where they are assigned.292 As in Italy,293 France, and Egypt,
newly appointed judges and prosecutors are assigned to perform a variety of judicial functions
which require a variety of professional qualifications and training. As they may be transferred from
one court or prosecutor’s office to another and, when promoted, be assigned to fill different
vacancies at the higher levels. Thus in such judicial systems, it is very complex to provide
institutions to offer not only effective initial and continuous training but also specific programs for
those who are transferred to different judicial functions across the entire judicial system. As an
example, a judge who works for one or two years in family courts, then he/she can work in the
economic courts for another two years, and after it, they can work in the civil circuits or labor
circuits, and so on throughout their careers.
Consequently, it is highly recommended that the lack of judges’ practical legal experience must
be compensated through training new judges whether in training schools as in the French model
or through on-the-job training as in the German model.294
Also, I indicate that the problem of fragmentation of the judicial training system in Egypt shall be
addressed by establishing a unified school or academy to appoint and train all members of the
judiciary. A good example of this is the UK,295 where its Judicial College was created in April
2011. Until that date, judges of the courts were trained by one body, while judges of the
administrative tribunals were trained by different bodies. All these bodies were merged to create
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the Judicial College, thus anyone who performs a judicial function in England and Wales is trained
by one institution, whether induction training or continuous training.
Another good example is found in the U.S. where the National Judicial College was established in
1963 at the recommendation of the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark and his committee
in their report.296 The National Judicial College is the only training institution in the United States
that teaches courtroom skills to judges of all types from all over the country.
Despite the accomplishments made by the NTA in training new judges and current ones, however,
the NTA is not appropriate to offer training to the members of the judiciary for an important reason,
which is the ownership of the judicial training, as its high board is composed of members of the
Executive and experts from the civil sector with no judicial component in it. Also, after my analysis
of the NCJS, under the Ministry of Justice, and although its high board is composed of judges and
some out-sider experts, however, it is ineffective and outdated, thus each judicial institution
decided to create its own training center. Thus, I will divide my proposals into three main parts,
firstly: analyzing the debate about the ownership of judicial training, followed by, secondly:
analyzing the debate about the preferred institution to be responsible for judicial appointment.
Thirdly and finally: proposing the most appropriate reform in the light of the Egyptian judicial
experience as well as the comparative systems.
The judicial appointment does not necessarily have to be exclusively in the hands of the judiciary
alone to ensure the judiciary’s independence. As we analyzed previously, judicial independence is
not an end in itself but a means. Therefore, some executive or legislative involvement in the
judicial appointments and training is not necessarily incompatible with the international standards
of judicial independence if they are based on objective qualifications, such as competence
and integrity.
This can be found in many international instruments, for example, the Universal Charter of the
Judge calls for the involvement of “an independent body, that includes substantial judicial
representation” in the selection, appointment and promotion processes.297 It is clear that the charter
does not specify that this body shall consist of judges only, however, all that concerns, is that the
independent body must include considerable representation of judges and prosecutors. Therefore,
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it is concludable that additional checks may be added to the body responsible for judicial
appointments by ensuring that the appointment power is shared among many authorities, thus,
avoiding nepotistic or discriminatory practices and preventing the corporate identity of the
judiciary. Other international instruments call for the inclusion of other professional groups in the
body responsible for appointing judges, or the participation of the Executive or Legislature in
judicial appointments, are namely: Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern
Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia regarding Judicial Administration, Selection and
Accountability,298 in addition to, the Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice in 1983
(Montreal Declaration).299
D. The National Judicial Academy (the NJA)
The high boards of the four judicial institutions still do not address the most critical problem in the
Egyptian justice system, which is the lack of clear standards and transparent criteria for selecting
and appointing members of the judiciary,300 ignoring the drawbacks of the systems of judicial
appointment and judicial training. Thus, the appointment authority shall be taken from the high
boards of judicial institutions and be given to an independent body. This body shall be responsible
for judicial appointment and judicial training as well. This body shall be independent,
governmentally well-funded, and its governing high board shall contain members of all branches
of government and all categories of society to ensure diversity in the justice system.
Consequently, the reform of both systems of judicial appointment and judicial training can be
attained through three methods, which are; firstly: either by enrolling non-judges in the NCJS,
whose high board is controlled by members of the judiciary, or secondly: by enrolling judges in
the NTA, whose high board is dominated by members of the Executive.
However, the NCJS is controlled by the Minister of Justice and is not independent. Also, the NTA
is all controlled by the Executive and was originally established as a national academy for training
young Egyptian leaders in all fields and all governmental sectors through fixed curricula.
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Therefore, the most appropriate method is through establishing an independent school only
specialized in appointing and training members of the justice system, thus, replacing the NTA and
the NCJS, and its high board shall be dominated by judges and prosecutors and shall include nonjudicial members, where the NTA and the newly independent body will be complementing each
other, such the ENA, the French National School for Administration, and the ENM in France,
where the ENA is responsible for training and qualifying civil servants in all governmental bodies
except the judiciary whose training is the responsibility of the ENM.
An independent body would be created that will be responsible for creating a unified system of
judicial appointment and training for all judicial institutions. This independent body shall carry the
name ‘The National Judicial Academy (NJA)’, and its mission is appointing and training not only
judges and prosecutors, but also all the personnel and the administrative staff of the justice system
and the aiding bodies that are affiliated to the Ministry of Justice such as: the Experts Authority,
the Forensic Medicine, and the Real Estate Registration and Documentation Authority. This is
because the literature on legal reform shows that judicial training is not only for judges and
prosecutors, as evidence proves that judicial training must include other justice sector personnel,
such as court staff and lawyers. 301
The governing board of the NJA would include judges as a majority in its composition along with
representatives of the other branches of government as well as lawyers and law academics, in
addition to, public figures representing the society that the judiciary serves. Moreover, members
of the governing board of the National Academy for Judiciary are required to receive training to
perform their functions in a good manner, since the functions of judicial appointment and judicial
training are of great importance that require certain knowledge and abilities.302 And for it to carry
out its functions regarding judicial training, it must hire significant and prominent educational and
behavioral experts to help in the design of the curriculum of the training programs.
The Higher Council shall set the unified criteria of the judicial appointment system as well as the
unified curriculum of judicial training programs for all judicial institutions. Then, the NJA shall
apply such criteria and implement such a curriculum. Also, the training centers existing in the
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different judicial institutions shall become branches for the NJA, in order to allocate more places
to allow more participants to take training from the different judicial institutions. Furthermore, the
NJA may issue and grant the diplomas and certifications that accredit the studies and the training
carried out in it, such as the French and Spanish Judicial Schools.
It is highly recommended to create a system of internships in the justice system to filter the best
qualifying candidates. The system of internship is adopted in France where the students of the
ENM take 15-month internships in which they work in courts and prosecution offices. After fifteen
months, students take internships in public and private administrative offices and carry out legal
research.303
Also, it is highly recommended to activate the lateral recruitment in the Egyptian judiciary from
lawyers and law professors as the non-requirement for professional legal experience before judicial
appointments expand the gap between both judges and lawyers, making the relations between the
two sides of the legal profession can be sometimes difficult.304 Adding to that, judicial socialization
of the newly appointed judges happens during the period of judicial training which is
generally supervised by senior judges and is controlled mainly by the judiciary.305. This happens
in the five fragmented training centers in the four judicial institutions. This problem was tackled
in France where lateral or side recruitments into the judiciary were made available, thus opening
the doors to experienced lawyers or merited civil servants to apply for the judiciary in order to
decrease corporatist attitudes in the judiciary.306 However, in Egypt recruitment from lawyers or
law academics is still not functioning despite the existence of article 116 of the Judicial Authority
Law,307 which states that the candidates who are members of the Bar Association and have at least
two years of working experience shall be appointed after passing a specific exam.
Moreover, it is recommended that economic aid would be offered to those who are unable to pay
the fees for applying for the NJA and the preparation courses for its examinations and tests. This
will contribute to offering opportunities to competent candidates from the lower socioeconomic
classes. Also, it is recommended that the appointment process should be on annual basis and the
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timeline of the appointment process should be determined and clarified to the candidates and the
public where the time for application and the time admitting candidates to the NJA would be
announced. This will contribute to eliminating the vagueness of the appointment process and
promoting its transparency and impartiality. Also, it will contribute to eliminating the
unnecessarily long time in the appointment process.
Furthermore, to promote judicial ownership and judicial leadership of judicial training, it is
recommended to adopt some methods such as:308 1) Leading and participating in the administration
of the training body. 2) Taking part in the faculty of the training body. 3) Participation in training
needs assessments. 4) Providing feedback on training services as part of monitoring and
evaluation. Furthermore, it is recommended that the training methodology within the NJA adopts
participatory and experiential methods based on interactive learning, and this is achieved through
a variety of designed experiments such as: simulation, legal events, conferences, competitions,
sports, discussion boards, lectures, workshops, simulation models, experiential learning, research,
and seminars. This technique is used in the NTA for high-level governmental officials.309
Moreover, it is recommended that the NJA creates a network of regional and international strategic
partnerships with reputable organizations that have common goals and objectives to exchange
experiences and share resources to provide a learning curve with good results. Therefore, the NJA
would enter into partnerships with leading organizations around the world in the field of justice
training. Also, it is highly recommended that besides the NJA’s essential mission in handling the
appointment process of new judges, it must also conduct proper initial training programs for them
in addition to continuous training programs throughout the judicial career, thus, the NJA’s

308

See Livingston Armytage, supra note 238, at 17.
Akhbar El-Youm, AL-AKADEMIYYA AL-WATANIYYA LEL-TADRĪB: TAKHARROG AL-DOFcA ALTHALTHA MEN MOSTASHRĪ AL-NEYABA AL-EDARIYYA, National Training Academy: Graduation of
the Third Batch of Administrative Prosecution Counselors, (8 December 2020). Retrieved from:
https://m.akhbarelyom.com/news/newdetails/3187584/1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8--%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%B9%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9

309

66

administration is must consist of two departments, the first is concerned with appointment and
initial training, and the second is concerned with Continuous Training.
It is highly recommended that the NJA uses the modern methods in training, also, that the state
would provide the NJA with the necessary funds to perform its responsibility properly, as the
Seventh Principle of the Amsterdam Judicial Training Principles adopted by the EJTN encourages
the use of modern educational methods in judicial training, and the Eighth Principle of the previous
instrument states that judicial training bodies should be provided with sufficient funding and any
other resources to attain their goals and objectives.
Consequently, the creation of the NJA would solve many issues existing in the justice system
concerning appointments and training which are, firstly, eliminating the fragmentation of the
judicial training centers. Secondly, the non-effectivity of the NCJS since 1981. Thirdly, the
impropriety of the NTA as a training center for judges and prosecutors.
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V. CONCLUSION
I began chapter one by explaining Egypt’s judicial appointment system and judicial training
system, followed by the defects and drawbacks of both systems. I highlighted the creation of the
NCJS and the non-activation of its appointment power since 1981 and the inefficiency of its
training authority which led each judicial institution to create its training center causing
fragmentation of the judicial training system.
In chapter two, I displayed the establishment of the Higher Council and the National Training
Academy (NTA), their formations, and their functions, as well as the accomplishments made by
both institutions in tackling many issues prevailing in the justice system, and most importantly the
arguments and discourses stating that both the newly created bodies are posing threats to the
independence of the judiciary. Thus, chapter 2 consists of two main parts, where in the first main
part, I am spotting the light on the Higher Council, where I explained judges’ reluctance to reform
the system of judicial appointments by stating two of the most famous incidents as examples and
proofs in addition to the abstention of appointing women as judges because of cultural and social
restrictions. Afterward, I discussed the status of the Egyptian judiciary in the 2014 Constitution
with respect to independence and accountability as well as the great need to create some degree of
judicial accountability. Then, I analyzed the comparative systems of judicial higher councils.
While in the second main part, I discussed the expansive role of the NTA in training judges. I
argued that it is not ideal to train judges because of the absence of judicial leadership and
ownership. Then, I analyzed the comparative systems of judicial schools.
In chapter three, I discussed how to use judicial appointment and judicial training as agents for
progress in the judiciary followed by the reform of judges’ mentality through judicial training,
especially regarding topics of gender equality. After it, I proposed a reform project to the systems
of judicial appointment and judicial training. I began the reform project by displaying the
importance of establishing an independent body responsible for judicial appointments and judicial
training. Then, I ended the reform project by proposing the creation of the National Judicial
Academy (NJA) which is responsible for judicial appointment and judicial training. Also, I stated
some recommendations that should be endorsed in the NJA.
I concluded that the Higher Council is not threatening judicial independence but rather creating a
balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability and this is because the Egyptian
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judiciary is too autonomous. I supported this argument by analyzing the comparative systems and
the international instruments regarding the composition of the higher judicial councils which state
that the existence of non-judicial members in the formation of the higher councils does not
necessarily threaten judicial independence. However, I proposed that the formation of the Egyptian
Higher Council needs to be modified.
I concluded that the NTA is not appropriate for training members of the judiciary because of the
domination of the Executive of its high board and the absence of any judicial component. I
supported my argument by studying the comparative systems of judicial schools. I indicated that
the governing boards of both the French and the Spanish judicial schools are led by judges and
have in their formations non-judicial members, and both of the governing boards contain at least
a member appointed by the Executive.
In conclusion, the Higher Council is not necessarily threatening judicial independence and the
NTA is not appropriate for judicial training. Also, the independence of the judiciary can be
promoted if the members of the judiciary are selected through a transparent and fair appointment
system which must be specified by the rules of law and not the whims of judges, along with
continuous and mandatory training programs whose content is determined by judges themselves,
with the significant participation of the private legal profession, law practitioners, law professors,
civil society actors, and educational experts. The design and application of any program for judicial
reform in order to be successful, it should include all the stakeholders of the justice system as well
as representatives of civil society.
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